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Abstract:  
In Canada, Australia, United States, and a number of other countries there are considerable 
number of producer controlled research organizations (PCROs) in the agricultural sector, 
charged with the task of investing hundreds of millions of dollars in research and development 
(R&D) projects. Given the impact of PCROs on productivity of agricultural sector and food 
security, the primary objective of this study is to improve the governance of PCROs by providing 
knowledge of the decision-making process and governance structure of these producer-led 
entities. The information related to the current governance structures and decision-making 
processes of PCROs is attained through analyzing a series of interviews with managers and 
directors of key PCROs in Australia, the U.S. and Canada.       
A great deal of similarity was observed across PCROs both in terms of the decision-
making process and governance structure. In particular, PCROs do not tend to separate 
management and oversight tasks. The producers elected directors of these organizations are 
involved in management decisions. This observed practice is in contrast with most of the theories 
and empirical studies focusing on the governance structure of non-profit (NP) and for-profit (FP) 
organizations (Brown & Guo, 2010; Fama & Jensen, 1983; LeRoux & Langer, 2016; Miller-
Millesen, 2003). Based on information gained from the interviews, observable characteristics of 
PCROs explained in the literature, and agency theory this dissertation develops a theoretical 
model to describe the unusual task assignment in the PCROs. The theoretical model suggests that 
because of the long investment horizons in the PCROs, the compensation of management teams 
based on their contributions to return on investments is not feasible. Therefore, the PCROs have 
to reward their executives on the basis of a measure of efforts exerted. Hence, the directors’ 
involvement reduces the volatility of managers’ compensation. Motivated by the theoretical 
model, a survey whose participants are the directors of Saskatchewan’s PCROs was conducted to 
examine the consistency of theoretical model’s implications and the task assignment practices of 
PCROs in the real world. The examination of the survey results suggests the presence of 
consistencies between the theoretical model’s implications and observed outcomes.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Problem statement  
Innovation is a key source of economic growth (Romer, 1990; Solow, 1957). In most 
economies, the agricultural sector has experienced remarkably higher and faster rates of growth 
than other sectors (Moschini & Lapan, 1997). The notable growth rate of agricultural sector 
stems from the investments in agricultural research (Alston, Norton, Pardey, & Others, 1995; 
Alston & Pardey, 1996). However, in recent decades governments and the private sector have 
changed their agricultural research investment behaviors, which could negatively affect the 
growth of agricultural sector and endanger food security (Alston, Gray, & Bolek, 2012).  
The failure of governments and the private sector to invest both sufficiently and efficiently 
in agricultural research has provided catalyst for the establishment of producer-controlled 
research organizations (PCROs). The organizations investigated in this dissertation are different 
than agricultural cooperatives and agricultural producers associations in which farmers are 
present at directors. PCROs are different than cooperatives because, as we explain later, PCROs 
have the non-distribution constraint and are considered as NP organizations. The PCROs do not 
have any residual claimants, as the shares are not defined in these entities.  However, 
cooperatives distribute their profits amongst their members (Hansmann 1980). The PCROs 
should be also distinguished from the agricultural producer associations that are NP 
organizations by nature. This is because the PCOs are typically granted taxing power by 
governments while agricultural producer associations, as NP organizations, do not have such a 
power. Furthermore, the PCROs are specially tasked with investing farmers’ checkoff in 
agricultural R&D and promotion projects while the tasks of agricultural cooperatives and 
agricultural producer associations include a wide range of activities including marketing, 
advocacy, distribution and so on. 
 Persistently very high rates of return to agricultural research (Hurley, Pardey, Rao, & 
Andrade, 2016), suggest that neither the private sector nor public sector has invested sufficient 
 2 
resources in agricultural research. In turn, the roles of industry groups such as PCROs have 
increased in agricultural research funding (Alston et al., 2012; Alston, Pardey, & Smith, 1998). 
In Canada, Australia, the United States and a number of other countries, there are a 
considerable number of PCROs in the agricultural sector. Collectively, they have been charged 
with the task of investing hundreds of millions of dollars in R&D projects with the objective of 
increasing the profitability of farming for the broad spectrum of members they represent. These 
producer-led organizations are increasingly operating in an environment where both private and 
the public entities are making investments, with the implication that PCROs must consider how 
to create synergy in research investment across the agricultural sector.  
Studies suggest PCROs investments have had significant impacts on agriculture innovation 
and the welfare of the producers and consumers (Alston, Chan-Kang, Marra, Pardey, & Wyatt, 
2000; Alston, James, & Pardey, 2011; Gray & Scott, 2003; Hurley, Pardey, Rao, & Andrade, 
2016; Williams, 1999). The studies also show that PCROs can improve the efficiency of resource 
allocation (Alston, Freebairn, & James, 2004; Kangasnimei, 2002). Because the board of 
directors of PCROs are farmers, they can respond to farmers’ research interests (Klerkx & 
Leeuwis, 2008; Röling, Hounkonnou, Offei, Tossou, & Van Huis, 2004). The PCROs are also 
considered new players in the national innovation system of countries. The presence of these 
organizations changes the dynamic of the innovation systems because their contributions result 
in new connections and knowledge flows affecting other parties behaviors in the system (Klerkx 
& Leeuwis, 2008).   
Increasingly PCROs may redirect the funds toward the projects benefiting the industry’s 
stakeholders rather than society as a whole. This is specially the case if the PCROs and nations 
have different incentives in funding of agricultural research (Alston, Freebairn, & James, 2003; 
Alston et al., 2004). In addition, the increasing role of PCROs in research funding could worsen 
the market and government failures by crowding out other parties interested in research 
investment (Alston et al., 2003, 2004). 
The returns on investments made in PCROs are accompanied with a great deal of delay. In 
a comprehensive study of U.S. public agricultural research investments, Alston et al. (2011) 
showed public agricultural research has measurable impacts 40 year after the investment was 
made, and the peak impact occurs 25 years after the investment is made. Similarly, PCRO 
investment outcomes are also realized several years after research investments are made.  
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Furthermore, the governance structure of PCROs, difference in producers’ innovativeness, 
agency problem due to difference in the interests of decisions makers (Alston & Fulton, 2012),  
institutional lock-in (Froystad, 2012), high rate of spillovers and negative attitudes of producers 
about the effectiveness of PCROs’ investments due to long investment horizon of these 
organizations (Gray, 2014) might results in the failure of these organizations to invest 
sufficiently and efficiently in agricultural research.  
Despite the importance of PCROs, their impact on agricultural sector, described above and 
a generally strong record of past performance, reflected in many benefit/cost studies (Alston, 
James, & Pardey, 2011; Gray & Scott, 2003; Hurley, Pardey, Rao, & Andrade, 2016), the 
decision-making and governance structure of PCROs has been a subject of very little study.  
1.2. Objective of the study  
The goal of this dissertation research is to explore decision-making process and 
governance structure of these producer-led entities with the objective of creating public 
knowledge that can improve the PCRO governance. The exploration began with a survey of 
decision-making process of some of 14 key PCROs in Australia, Canada and the U.S. The survey 
revealed a great deal of similarities across PCROs. In particular, with one exception, PCROs do 
not separate management and oversight tasks. The members of board of directors charged with 
oversight of these entities are also directly engaged in research allocation decisions. The PCROs’ 
task assignment practice is in contrast with most of the theories and empirical studies focusing 
on the governance structure of NP and for-profit (FP) organizations (Brown & Guo, 2010; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; LeRoux & Langer, 2016; Miller-Millesen, 2003). To gain insight into this 
unusual behavior this dissertation develops a theoretical model to describe the task assignment in 
the PCROs based on the interviews, characteristics of PCROs and agency theory. Finally, 
hypotheses derived from the theoretical model are examined through a survey of the directors of 
grain PCROs in Canadian province of Saskatchewan.   
As outlined in more detail below this exploration of PCRO decision-making has led to a 
better understanding of governance of PCROs and other organizations with long investment 
horizons or highly uncertain returns.  
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1.3. Dissertation content 
1.3.1. Overview 
To meet the objectives explained above, this doctoral dissertation encompasses three 
phases of interconnected research, which are presented as sequential chapters in this dissertation. 
This dissertation follow methodologies documented by Eisenhardt (1989), Eisenhardt and 
Graebner (2007) and Siggelkow (2007) to meet its objectives. The use of case studies to develop 
theories has become a common practice in management science (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
This research method involves an examination of a series of cases to generate theoretical 
concepts. Building theories from case studies are based on induction, where each case is 
investigated separately and then the connections amongst the cases are taken into consideration. 
In this case, repetitive phenomena are highlighted to show the existence of a general logic in 
examination of cases. The next step includes documenting the analyses of cases in the context of 
existing theories and strands of literature to focus on the contribution of the examinations cases 
(Yin, 1994). Finally, as it is suggested by Siggelkow (2007) the theory created should have 
consistencies with the real word.  
This study examines the governance structure and decision-making process of PCROs. 
Then it highlights the differences and similarities amongst these entities. Consequently, given the 
existing theories and literature, the study attempts to provide theoretical explanations of PCROs’ 
governance structure. Finally, this doctoral dissertation tries to illustrate the theory developed has 
value as it is capable of explaining governance of PCROs in the real world.  
The first study, presented in Chapter 2, describes the current governance structures and 
decision-making processes of PCROs, by analyzing information gained through series of 
interviews with managers and directors of key PCROs in Australia, Canada and the United 
States. An attempt is made to explain the nature of PCROs’ functions in the context of theories 
related to the governance of non-profit (NP) organizations. Interestingly, with only one 
exception, PCROs do not separate management and oversight. This unusual task assignment 
practice, which is not consistent with the general practice of most non-profit and for profit 
organizations, is the basis of the subsequent chapter of this doctoral study.  
Chapter 3 of this dissertation develops a theoretical model to describe the unusual task 
assignment in the PCROs. This novel agency based theoretical model allows the examination of 
several factors on the weight assigned to the board of directors in the decision-making process. 
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The factors include uncertainty in output and input measurement, types of compensation 
schemes, the relative quality of decision-making of directors and managers, altruism and learning 
capacity of directors. Motivated by the implications of the theoretical model, two testable 
hypotheses are developed, which are examined in the subsequent chapter.  
Chapter 4 reports the results of a survey focusing on the board members of Saskatchewan’s 
PCROs. The results show some consistencies between the hypotheses posited by the theoretical 
model and observed outcomes. Finally, Chapter 5 provides summary, conclusions and 
implications of the dissertation. 
As a means of more formal introduction, the remainder of this section describes the 
objective, methodology, results, implications and contributions of each of the studies that 
constitute Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this dissertation, which explores the governance 
structure, and decision-making of PCROs.  
1.3.2. Research Allocation Decision-Making in PCROs 
Chapter 2 of this doctoral dissertation provides a comprehensive examination of how some 
of the key PCROs in Australia, the U.S. and Canada make research allocation decisions. The 
information related to the governance structure and decision-making processes of PCROs was 
primarily collected through interviews with manager and directors of seventeen organizations 
including fourteen PCROs, one cooperative (Limagrain) and two publicly funded organizations 
(Agriculture Development Fund (ADF) and Genome Prairie). The “redundancy point” (Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985) and “theoretical saturation” (Eisenhardt, 1989) were taken into consideration to 
choose the number of PCROs, where widespread consistency in the responses limited the 
expected gain from additional interviews. In addition, some of information about the 
organizations was obtained from the websites of these entities. Each interview addresses: 
objective, missions, constraints, governance structure, decision-making stages, criteria used to 
allocate resources and so on. This part of the study focuses on grain-based PCROs with varying 
checkoff revenues, mechanisms, different intellectual property rights, and range of scale and 
scope.  
From analyzing the interviews, a great deal of similarity across PCROs governance 
structures was observed. Some of the findings of this part of the research are as follows: 
1) by definition the PCROs are NP organizations. NP organization is defined as an entity 
that does not lawfully distribute its profit to the stakeholders (i.e. non-distribution restriction) 
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(Hansmann 1980; Weisbrod 1988). The PCROs have the same characteristic where farmers, as 
the patrons and beneficiaries of the PCROs, do not have direct right over the revenues or 
outcomes of the investments proportional to their contributions.  
2) The analyses of PCROs functions examined in the study suggest that, based on 
Hansmann (1980)’s classification, the PCROs are primarily categorized as a mix of donative-
mutual and donative-entrepreneurial. This is because the farmers’ contributions are the primary 
source of funding in the PCROs and farmers and professional managers are in charge of these 
organizations’ decision-making. Besides, it was observed that a considerable number of PCROs 
are involved in commercial activities as well.    
3) One can distinguish between five stages of decision-making in the research funding 
decision of PCROs: i) determination of priorities, ii) request for proposals (RFP), iii) review and 
ranking of proposals, iv) measuring performance and v) finally collecting information about 
growers’ feedbacks and their research interests.  
4) PCROs use different methods to rank the projects. However, in most of the PCROs 
sampled, projects are reviewed and ranked based on scoring methods. Organizations then rely on 
research committees and the boards of directors to choose amongst the projects.  
5) PCROs do not tend to separate between management and oversight tasks. In other 
words, the directors of these organizations are highly involved in most of the stages explained 
above.  
The study presented in the Chapter 2 makes several contributions: 1) it fills a gap in the 
literature related to the governance of PCROs by providing an extensive examination of these 
organizations decision-making process and governance structures. 2)  it provides a theoretical 
explanation about the nature of PCROs’ functions in the context of NP organizations literature, 
3) the study also reveals an apparent anomaly in the governance of PCROs by showing that the 
oversight and management tasks are not separated in these producer-led entities, 4) finally this 
study provides the best management practices that can be used by PCROs to improve their 
governance and decision-making.  
1.3.3. Who Governs PCROs in the Agricultural Sector and Why? 
Chapter 3 develops an agency-based theoretical model of task assignment in PCROs. As 
explained in section 1.3.2, PCROs do not tend to separate management decisions and oversight. 
In fact, during the interviews, it became clear that with one exception, boards of directors are 
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involved in both the management decisions and oversight of those decisions. The theoretical 
model is developed to explain why PCROs tend to assign a substantial portion of managerial 
decisions to their boards of directors. 
The agency-based theoretical model builds on the task delegation literature. Under the 
moral hazard problem, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) discuss that the principle will delegate a 
job to only one agent, if it is difficult to measure the contribution of each agent separately. 
PCROs have long gestation periods for their research, making output measurement very difficult 
and subject to uncertainty, which makes the task of incentivizing managers based on output 
costly and difficult. This is because rewarding the manager based on the highly volatile measure 
of the investments’ outcome (i.e. measuring an effect that will be realized after several years) is 
not an optimal tool to motivate the management team. Therefore, the contract rewarding the 
manager should be based on another indication of the management team’s efforts. In this case, 
Sappington (1991) suggests the organizations could use a measure of the manager’s input. 
However, use of such a measure is possible only if there is a third party observing the 
management efforts exerted. Hence, it is suggested that the board’s involvement in the decision-
making process is necessary to incentivize the managers of PCROs. On the other hand 
incentivizing managers based on input requires some observation of the decision-making 
process.   
In the model the PCRO must delegate the share of decision-making power to the manager 
and the board of directors, with the objective of maximizing return to producers. This choice is 
determined by several factors, including the characteristics of the board of directors, the relative 
knowledge levels of the manager and board members, and the ability to incentivize the effort of 
the manager based on imperfectly measured output or decision-making input. Managers tend to 
be imperfectly incentivized, because output can only be measured with long lags and uncertainty, 
and input measurement requires monitoring. Board members, on the other hand, can be less 
knowledgeable, but can be motivated by vested interest in outcomes, altruism and learning 
opportunities.  
In the case of an output-based bonus, the results of the model suggest the PCRO decides to 
assign the task to either the almost perfectly incentivized manager or the board of directors, 
depending on their relative effectiveness. A separation of decision-making and oversight would 
exist in this case, over a range of plausible parameter values. However, when the manager’s 
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reward is based on his/her input, given similar characteristics of the board and the manager, the 
shared decision is more likely to be the norm if the board is not significantly altruistic. However, 
if the board is highly altruistic, the PCRO decides to share the decision-making if the manager’s 
input qualities, including his knowledge level or cost of exerting efforts, are judged to be 
superior.  In these situations, the board of directors will generally also participate in order to both 
incentivize managerial effort and help the PCRO to reach its objectives.  
The findings of the Chapter 3 of this dissertation imply that there is a rationale behind the 
apparent anomaly observed in the governance structure of PCROs. The governance structure of 
PCROs can be explained by the presence of an agency problem related to the short-term 
measurement of output. Hence, the PCROs could reconsider their contracts with managers to 
provide more effective incentives for parties involved in decision-making.   
In addition, the study found that board members’ altruism, learning capacity and 
knowledge levels are critical to the success of PCROs. This implies that resources spent on 
recruitment, training and retention will play long-term dividends for producers supporting the 
PCROs.  
The contributions of the research results presented in the third chapter of this dissertation 
are as follow: 1) it provides a theoretical explanation about the lack of separation between 
oversight and management in the PCROs. It also expands the theory developed by Hansmann 
(1980) regarding the presence of patrons in controlling of an organization, 2) it contributes to the 
task delegation literature by incorporating the impact of long investment horizons on the task 
assignments, the output versus inputs performance measures and collective incentives. 3) the 
study also provides basis for further investigations of NP and FP organizations in which the 
return on investments are accompanied with great deal of delay and uncertainty.  
1.3.4. Survey of directors of Saskatchewan Grain PCROs 
 Chapter 4 of this dissertation examines two hypotheses derived from the theoretical model 
presented in Chapter 3. In fact, due to the shared decision-making observed during the course of 
interviews, a theoretical model is developed in Chapter 3 allowing us to discuss the conditions 
explaining the task assignment practice of PCROs. The hypotheses below are about the 
conditions that would lead to these outcomes.   
The first hypothesis is: PCROs that use shared decision-making may not have frictionless 
measures of either managerial input or PCRO’s output. The second hypothesis is: PCROs that 
 9 
use shared decision-making may either have highly altruistic directors perceiving the managers 
to be more knowledgeable than the board members or their directors are not altruistic.  
Data from a follow-up survey of the directors of all (eight) grain PCROs within the 
Canadian province of Saskatchewan was used to examine these hypotheses. Twenty-two out the 
fifty-two of the board members from these grain PCROs took part in the survey. The survey 
questionnaire contained seventy-four semi-structured questions capturing information about the 
directors’ experiences both as farmers and board members of PCROs. The survey includes 
questions about the experiences of the participants both as farmers and directors.  
In the case of the first hypothesis, the directors’ stated the returns on investments are not 
considered as a basis for the managers’ compensation and indicated that the manager's 
contribution to the PCRO's performance is difficult to measure. In addition, the respondents 
revealed that directors follow different methods to evaluate the managers’ inputs. These 
differences in evaluation approaches imply the input performance measures are not frictionless.  
In the case of the second hypothesis, the responses revealed that the directors are highly altruistic 
directors, while most of board members surveyed believed the managers are more 
knowledgeable than the directors. Therefore, this hypothesis is also consistent with real world 
task assignment in Saskatchewan PCROs. To sum up, these results are consistent with the 
theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 explaining the behavior of PCROs and their task 
assignment practices, and therefore provide some empirical support for the model.  
1.3.5. The Concluding Chapter 
Chapter 5 briefly summarizes the dissertation, presents conclusions, and discusses 
implications of the research.  
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Chapter 2: Review of decision-making processes and governance structures of key 
PCROs in Australia, the U.S. and Canada 
2.1 Introduction 
In Canada, Australia, the U.S., New Zealand and a number of other countries a range of 
public and producer controlled research organizations (PCROs) in the agricultural sector are 
charged with the challenging task of investing millions of dollars in R&D and market promotion 
projects. The organizations investigated in this dissertation are different than agricultural 
cooperatives and agricultural producers associations in which farmers are present as directors. 
PCROs are different than cooperatives because as we explain later, PCROs have the non-
distribution constraint and considered as NP organizations. The PCROs do not have any residual 
claimants, as the shares are not defined in these entities.  However, cooperatives distribute their 
profits amongst their members (Hansmann 1980). The PCROs should be also distinguished from 
the agricultural producer associations that are NP organizations by nature. This is because the 
PCOs are typically granted taxing power by governments while agricultural producer 
associations, as NP organizations, do not have such a power. Furthermore, the PCROs are 
specially tasked with investing farmers’ checkoff in agricultural R&D and promotion projects 
while the tasks of agricultural cooperatives and agricultural producer associations include a wide 
range of activities including marketing, advocacy, distribution and so on.  
 The PCROs main funding source is the levies paid by farmers. Every year, farmers have to 
pay a proportion of their sale or the monetary value of the crop(s) produced to these 
organizations. Investments made by PCROs are primarily related to agricultural innovation and 
market promotion projects for the crops the farmers pay levies on. Because these organizations 
are usually too small to have their own research facilities, PCROs have significant collaboration 
with universities or other research entities.  
The decision-making required to allocate research money effectively is complex. The 
PCROs are tasked with the challenge of investing to increase the productivity of farming for a 
broad spectrum of members, with different needs and research interests. These producer-led 
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organizations are also increasingly operating in an environment where both private firms and the 
public sector are making investments. This implies that PCROs must consider how to create 
industry synergy through research investment.  
Despite their generally strong record of past performance measured by many benefit/cost 
studies (Williams, 1999, Alston, Chan-Kang, Marra, Pardey, & Wyatt, 2000; Alston, James, & 
Pardey, 2011; Gray & Scott, 2003; Hurley, Pardey, Rao, & Andrade, 2016), the governance 
structure and methodologies used to allocate funds in the PCROs have not been extensively 
examined. While the choice of the best  R&D projects is economically important, very little is 
known about the nature of producer controlled research organizations, who makes the investment 
decisions in them and how.  
This chapter has two purposes. Firstly, it reviews and compares the governance structures 
and the decision-making processes of some of the key PCROs across Australia, the U.S. and 
Canada. Secondly, it develops best practices for the PCROs and other types of organizations.  
In fact, this part of the study is the first piece of the methodology trying to build theory 
form case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Siggelkow, 2007). This 
chapter reports the analyses of a series of interviews and then describes the differences and 
similarities in PCROs governance structures and decision-making process. In addition, this 
chapter highlights some of the governance features of PCROs in the context of NP organizations 
and agency theory literature.  
The information presented in this chapter is collected through interviews and by reviews of 
the websites of the entities in the sample. The interviews included semi-structured questions. 
Interviews collected information about the process of investment decision-making and the agents 
who are in charge of making decisions. The survey covered a range of PCROs with varying 
levels of checkoff revenues and covering different types of grains. Livestock PCROs were 
excluded because of the differences in the nature of innovation in livestock and grain industries. 
It should be noted that the “redundancy point” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and “theoretical 
saturation”1 (Eisenhardt, 1989) were taken into consideration regarding the number of  PCROs in 
the sample.  
                                                
 
1. The “redundancy point” and “theoretical saturation” are the rule of thumbs in conducting interviews. In both 
cases, the researcher gets to a point after which more interviews do not provide new information and insights. 
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The analyses of interviews reflect the characteristics of these entities in their decision-
making. In addition, the interviews revealed that in contrast to the existing theories and several 
studies, the board of directors in all PCROs, except Australia’s Grain Research and Development 
Corporation (GRDC), are involved both in management and oversight tasks in their 
organizations. In the GRDC the board of directors’ roles are more in the form of oversight. 
However, the producers are involved in management of these organizations where the priorities 
are determined by regional panels.  
Section 2.2 of this chapter, provides background about the PCROs and then reviews some 
of the characteristics of the PCROs in our sample. Section 2.3, discusses information about the 
process of data collection and interviews structures. Section 2.4 reviews and compares the 
governance structure of the PCROs in the sample. The decision-making processes of PCROs are 
described in Section 2.5. Discussion regarding analyses of the interviews is presented in Section 
2.6 and finally Section 2.7 provides the concluding remarks.   
2.2. Review of the PCROs Characteristics 
This section reviews the features of the PCROs and their importance in agricultural  R&D 
by review of the literature and then describes some of the characteristics of the PCROs in our 
sample.  
2.2.1. The Impact of PCROs on the Agricultural sector 
Studies indicate governments and the private sector have begun to decrease their funding 
of agricultural research. However, the role of industry groups such as PCROs have increased in 
research funding (Alston et al., 2012, 1998). There are several studies indicating PCROs’ 
investments have had significant impacts on agricultural innovation and the welfare of producers 
and consumers (Alston et al., 2000, 2011; Gray & Scott, 2003; Hurley et al., 2016; Williams, 
1999). The studies also show that PCROs improve the efficiency of resource allocation, and 
decision-making process (Alston et al., 2004; Kangasnimei, 2002). Because the board of 
directors of PCROs are farmers, they can provide proper investment guides to respond to 
farmers’ research interests (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008; Röling et al., 2004). On the other hand, the 
PCROs are considered a new player in the national innovation system of a country. The presence 
of these organizations changes the dynamics of the system because their contributions result in 
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new connections and knowledge flows affecting other parties’ behavior in the system (Klerkx & 
Leeuwis, 2008).   
 However, the increasing role of PCROs may redirect the funds toward the projects 
benefiting the industry’s stakeholders rather than society as a whole, especially in cases where 
the PCROs and society have different incentives in funding agricultural research. These 
differences stem from the elasticity of supply and demand and the impact of innovation on the 
supply of the product. (Alston et al., 2003, 2004). In addition, the increasing role of PCROs in 
research funding could worsen the market and governments failures by crowding out other 
parties interested in research investment (Alston et al., 2003, 2004).  
2.2.2. The Characteristics of PCROs in our Sample 
Table 2.1 indicates the revenues and the shares of  R&D projects of the organizations in the 
sample. In total, the organizations sampled earned more than C$465 million in 2015 or 2016.  
The organizations rely primarily on farmers’ contributions.  
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Table 2.1. The Characteristics of the Organizations Investigated in the Sample 
 
 
 The largest organization in the sample is the Grains  Research and Development 
Corporation (GRDC), with gross revenue of C$201 million in 2016 and the smallest one is the 
Saskatchewan Flax Development Commission (SFDC) whose revenue was C$1.4 million in 
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2016. United Soybean Board (USB) and Saskatchewan Pulse Growers (SPG) are two other large 
organizations in the sample.  
 There is a positive correlation between revenue and percentage of expenditure on R&D 
investment. For instance GRDC, as the largest organization in the sample, spent more than 97 
percent of its revenue on research projects. However, there are other factors determining the 
share of revenue expenditure on R&D, such as significance of market promotion for the PCROs. 
For instance, although USB’s revenue is considerable, it spends only 62 percent of its revenue on 
R&D projects because an important part of its budget is allocated to market promotion.   
 The PCROs in the study have different historical backgrounds. The oldest organization in 
in the sample is the Kansas Wheat Commission (KWC) established in 1957 and the youngest 
organization is the Saskatchewan Wheat Development Commission (SWDC) founded in 2013.  
In some cases, such as KWC, SPG and Western Grains Research Foundation (WGRF), farmers 
first founded the organizations and then they were granted rights by officials to collect levies. In 
some other cases, such as GRDC and USB, governments had the main roles in establishing the 
entities. Some of the organizations such as Alberta Wheat Commission (AWC), Grain Farmers 
of Ontario (GFO) and SWDC were established recently. AWC and GFO are the result of mergers 
between several other organizations who decided to operate under one umbrella.   
2.3.  Interview Structure and the Process of Data Collection. 
To collect information about the governance structure and decision-making processes of 
PCROs in the agricultural sector, semi-structured interviews were conducted with managers and 
directors of 17 organizations including 14 PCROs and one cooperative (Limagrain) and two 
publicly funded organizations (ADF and Genome Prairie). The interviews were conducted by 
Seyed Hamzeh Hosseini (PhD Candidate) and Richard Gray (Professor) at the University of 
Saskatchewan. Each interview included ten semi-structured questions. The questions included 
categories that are: objective, missions and constraints, governance structure, decision-making 
process, criteria used to allocate resources, method(s) by which the proposals are solicited, and 
performance measures.  
 The PCROs in the sample were selected using two key criteria, checkoff revenue and the 
commodity. It was important to cover a range of PCROs regarding their checkoff revenues and 
the types of grains that the PCROs work on.  
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 Except for KWC, Montana Wheat and Barley Committee (MWBC), and GFO, we had 
face-to-face interviews with the managers or directors of the rest of PCROs in the sample. On 
average the interviews lasted about one hour. The webpages of the PCROs were also examined 
to garner an understanding of their financial status, decision-making processes and governance 
structures.  
2.4. The Governance Structure 
Analyzing the interviews regarding governance structure specifically focuses on the nature 
of PCROs activities, their ownership structure, funding sources and the agents who are in charge 
of making the decisions. 
2.4.1 PCROs as NP Organizations 
In terms of ownership structure, PCROs are non-profit (NP) organizations. A NP 
organization is defined as an entity that does not lawfully distribute its profit to the stakeholders 
(i.e. non-distribution restriction) (Hansmann 1980; Weisbrod 1988). PCROs have the same 
characteristic where farmers, as the patrons and beneficiaries of the PCROs, do not have direct 
rights over the revenues or outcomes of the investments proportional to their contributions. In 
these organizations, the research results are more or less available for everyone. 
The establishment of agriculture PCROs stems from market and government failures in 
providing sufficient and efficient investments in agricultural R&D (Alston et al., 2012). In the 
literature, the formation of NP organizations also initiates from the three failures that are: 
government failure, market failure and contract failure (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen 1991; 
Hansmann 1980; Weisbrod 1972; Weisbrod 1988).  
Market Failure 
Demand-side stakeholders usually form NP enterprises. The demand-side stakeholders 
form the organizations because they are not satisfied with the quantity or quality of goods 
supplied by market or government (Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, 1991; Weisbrod, 1972). 
Similarly, in many cases, farmers themselves lobbied for establishment of PCROs (Alston et al., 
2012).  
Government Failure 
The NP organizations may also have advantages over governments because the 
governments could fail to respond to all parties’ interests in a country (Weisbrod, 1972). This 
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government failure stems from the fact that it has to finance the provision of public goods with 
taxes. In the case of crop research, the very high benefit/cost ratio and internal rate of return 
suggests there is a chronic failure to invest enough in agricultural research. However, 
governments have a tendency to cover the median or mean voters’ preferences.  The use of 
median or mean voters’ preferences still keep a considerable part of the society unsatisfied 
because the government will not be able to equate the marginal tax and marginal benefit of 
public goods consumption for everyone.  
One of the reactions of non-satisfied consumers in this case is establishing organizations 
providing the demanded collective goods for non-median voters. In other words, the presence of 
NP sector is an optimal reaction (as the second-best option) to provide collective goods for 
under-satisfied individuals. The NP sector in this context complements with both the government 
and private sector in the provision of public or collective goods (Weisbrod, 1972).  
Contract Failure 
Due to the market conditions, or the nature of some products and services, there are 
situations in which consumers cannot properly evaluate the quantity or quality of goods and 
services supplied by the market. Therefore, the contracts between consumers and suppliers about 
the provision of demanded goods may not be enforced appropriately (Hansmann, 1980). In this 
setting, NP organizations can be considered as an alternative for other sources of public or 
collective goods provision.  
The superiority of NP enterprises in comparison with for-profit (FP) organizations is 
related to the non-distribution constraint. In the presence of a non-distribution constraint NP 
organizations do not strictly look for maximizing returns. Thus, they are less likely to show 
shirking behaviors in provision of high quality goods and services. (Ben-Ner and Van 
Hoomissen 1991; Easley and O’Hara 1983; Hansmann 1980; Weisbrod 1972; Weisbrod 1988).  
 PCROs in Presence of Government, Market and Contract Failures 
The establishment of PCROs is also connected to government, market and contract 
failures. Studies indicate governments have begun to decrease their funding of agricultural 
research while the results of benefit/cost analyses imply that investment in agricultural research 
have a considerable rate of return. In fact, because of the high rates of return one could expect 
that governments should increase their contributions in agricultural research; however, the 
opposite trend has been observed (Alston et al., 2012, 1998).  Governments' insufficient 
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investments in agricultural research are related to the fact that farmers are not the median voters 
in many developed countries anymore. In the case of market failure, the private sector considers 
appropriability factors in its investments behaviors.  
In addition in recent years a great number of mergers and acquisitions have been observed 
in the agricultural sector, such that the few large private firms who controlled a considerable 
share of the farming input market have gained even more market power (Howard, 2009). This 
increase in the degree of consolidation is a possible source of contract failure in agricultural 
research investment. In this situation, as the private firms have market power, they cannot be 
harmed if they fail to fulfill the terms of the contracts with farmers in provision of inputs.   
PCROs’ Classification  
Hansmann (1980) distinguishes between four types of NP organizations based on financing 
source and who is in control. According to the categorization, NP organizations can fund their 
expenses from donations or the sale of their services. These organizations are called donative and 
commercial respectively. The individuals that are the main source of NP organizations’ funding 
are called “patrons” and according to Hansmann (1980), NP organizations can be controlled by 
their patrons or by other individuals. The former, controlled by patrons, are classified as 
“mutual” and the latter as “entrepreneurial” NP organizations. The four types of NP 
organizations are as follows: donative-mutual (e.g. political clubs, PCROs), donative-
entrepreneurial (e.g. CARE, art museums), commercial-mutual (e.g. consumers’ unions, country 
clubs) and commercial-entrepreneurial (e.g. nursing homes, National Geographic Society, 
community hospitals). 
Hansmann (1980) also discusses that the rationale behind the existence of commercial NP 
organizations is both market and contract failures. The information asymmetry between 
consumers and producers increases the demands for commercial NP organizations. In this 
context, the commercial NP organizations usually compete with their FP counterparts, 
(Hansmann, 1980). Because of the non-distribution constraint, the founders and patrons of NP 
organizations do not show shirking behaviors in the provision of high quality goods and services 
(Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001). Therefore, if qualities are non-contractible and consumers value the 
quality, the demand for NP organization’ goods and services will be higher than those of FP 
firms (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001; Lakdawalla & Philipson, 2006).  
 19 
  Some NP organizations perform as a combination of the aforementioned categories. For 
example, universities are funded both by donors and student tuition and both of these groups are 
somehow involved in the administrations of these entities. Other examples of mixed entities 
include daycares that are controlled by parents, where the donations and daycare fees are the 
financial sources used to cover expenses (Hansmann 1980).  
 The PCROs in the sample are primarily a mix of donative-mutual and donative-
entrepreneurial because farmers and professional managers are both in charge of decision-
making of these entities. However, in some organizations such as GRDC the weight attached to 
the managers is higher than the producers.  
In addition, WGRF, SPG, GFO, Manitoba Corn Growers (MCG), USB, Iowa Soybean 
Promotion Board (ISPB), KWC and MWBC are also commercial NP organizations as they earn 
revenues by supplying their projects results (e.g. new varieties) in the market. GRDC is a mix of 
a donative-mutual, donative-entrepreneurial and commercial- NP organization, as farmers are not 
the main decision-makers in this unit. As it is explained later, the hired managers and staff are 
primarily in charge of making investment decisions in project levels. However, the producers’ 
input is used in the GRDC as one of the sources for determining the “investment themes”. In 
addition, this organization relies on farmers’ check-off payments, government’s contribution and 
the sale of its varieties, royalties and other applications of research projects. 
 WGRF is also a mix of the donative-mutual, donative-entrepreneurial and commercial-
entrepreneurial structure. This is because WGRF’s board of directors is the directors of other 
PCROs and farm association organizations in Canada. WGRF’s revenue sources are farmers’ 
checkoff payments, government’s contribution2, royalties, and the sale of its varieties and other 
applications of research projects. 
                                                
 
2 Canadian Pacific Railway Company and Canadian National Railway Company have to pay an amount 
to Canadian Transportation Agency (CTA) when they exceed their Maximum Revenue Entitlement for 
movement of grain in Western Canada. In turn, the Federal government in Canada pays a part of this 
money to WGRF in the form of an “endowment fund”.  
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2.4.2. Funding Sources 
The main source of funding in all of the PCROs in our sample is a producer levy. Also, 
GRDC, WGRF and MWBC receive additional funding from the governments of Australia, 
Canada and the U.S. respectively.  
The government of Canada’s funding leverages the checkoff money invested in WGRF. In 
this process, for every producer checkoff dollar spent the government doubles or matches the 
investments. In addition, WGRF is one of the organizations receiving a part of the endowment 
funds, such that in the last 10 years the WGRF has received about C$73 million to invest in crop 
research projects (WGRF, 2014)  .  
GRDC primarily relies on levies paid by farmers and the government’s matching of these 
levies. Based on the type of crop produced, the levy rates are 0.99 and 0.693 percent of the gross 
sale in each year. The government contribution is based on a three-year rolling average, where 
the Australian government matches the amount collected up to 0.5 percent (GRDC, 2011).  
These two organizations also use other sources of income such as licensing fees, and 
royalties on their research results.  
Some of the PCROs will return the producer checkoff received if the farmer requests a 
refund. Based on the results of our interviews, the refund rates in all organizations are usually 
below 10 percent. In addition, some of the organizations such as SPG, GRDC and USB do not 
refund the levies collected.  
2.4.3. Board of Directors  
In most of the organizations, the directors are elected or appointed based on their local 
attachment or crop districts. In the case of Saskatchewan PCROs, regional attachment does not 
play any role in the determination of board members directly. However, regional attachment may 
affect the election results if a director is in a region in which the number of voters is 
proportionally more than other areas. In the case of regionally elected or appointed boards, it 
seems that the decisions made by PCROs could be biased toward areas with more board 
members.  
Government officials or other farming organizations appoint the directors of GRDC, USB, 
WGRF and MWBC. In the case of USB, GRDC and MWBC, farming organizations nominate 
candidates to the government officials responsible for appointing board members. The 
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government officials select directors amongst the nominees. In these cases, the appointed 
directors are accountable to both farmers and government for their actions. In the rest of the 
PCROs in our sample, farmers elect the directors.   
The directors of USB are recommended by the states-level beneficiaries to the federal 
government for appointment on the USB board. There are 73 directors involved in USB 
decision-making. The number of directors from each state is directly associated with the level of 
soybean production in that jurisdiction. 
Similarly, in the GRDC, the boards are appointed by the Australian government, based on 
the directors’ resumes and recommendations of growers and other industry stakeholders. 
However, the involvement of the GRDC board is limited to oversight with little direct 
involvement in the decision-making relative to the other PCROs in our sample. WGRF is a 
membership-based organization and its board of directors represents eighteen PCROs or 
associations as the members of this organization. 
2.5. Decision-Making Process 
The interviews showed there are five stages of decision-making in more or less all of 
PCROs: 1) determination of priorities, 2) request for proposals (RFP), 3) review and ranking of 
proposals, 4) performance measures and 5) collecting information about growers’ feedback and 
their interest in research. The detailed information about these stages is presented in Appendix A, 
however the following section will outline the key points about the five stages of decision-
making.  
Figure 2.1 indicates a typical decision-making process of the PCROs we interviewed. As is 
shown in this figure, the process is essentially a cycle, where first the board based on the industry 
needs and research interests determines the priorities. After the investment decisions are made in 
many organizations, farmers’ feedback about the effect of investments are collected. The 
information gathered in this section could influence future decisions regarding the investment 
properties. 
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Figure 2.1. The Typical Decision-Making Process of PCROs in The Sample  
2.5.1 Determination of Priorities  
The interviews revealed that one or more than one agent contributed to the determination 
of the investment priorities. These sources are directors, surveys of producers, scientists’ 
recommendations, the research staff of the organizations and governments’ priorities. However, 
in many cases, the directors are the main agents identifying the priorities.  
Figure 2.2 illustrates the general process of determining priorities in the POCs. The main 
difference between the organizations is related to the weight of each source in the determination 
of priorities and strategies.  
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Figure 2.2. The process of determining PCROs’ investment priorities and strategies 
In the case of GRDC, their board of directors is restricted to a role of oversight and 
approves the priorities that are recommended by the National Panel but is not directly involved 
in the project identification process. The National Panel in turn consolidates input from the 
regional panels. The regional panels include growers, agribusinesses, experts and staff of three 
regions in Australia. The regional panels collect information about regional and national issues 
through communication with growers, industry representatives, Regional Cropping Solution 
Networks (RCSNs) and Growers Solutions Groups (GSGs).  
Notably, RCSNs and GSGs are new entities, empowered to make contributions in 
governance and decision-making of the GRDC. The members of RCSNs are local farmers, agri-
business representatives and local scientists. RCSNs represent local needs and interest to the 
higher levels of decision-making in the GRDC. In fact, RCSNs were established to provide 
information to the GRDC regarding problems and priorities in their regions. The members of 
RCSNs meet on a regular basis to discuss the main issues and priorities for R&D investments. 
RCSNs also have a small research budget they can directly use to address more immediate local 
issues. 
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 RCSNs working with regional panels play an important role in determining priorities. 
There are nine RCSNs in Southern and Western Australia. The southern region is divided into 
four zones, based upon the amount of precipitation: high, medium and low rainfall zones and an 
irrigation zone. The western region is divided into five “port zones” including Geraldton, 
Kwinana West, Kwinana East, Esperance and Albany. For instance, 36 priorities were identified 
in Southern RCSNs during 2013-14, resulting in the GRDC making new investments in 17 areas. 
Issues are also addressed by increasing investments in ongoing projects. 
In addition, GSGs are also a new part of the GRDC governance. These groups directly 
engage growers and agribusiness and experts to provide solutions for local problems. The GRDC 
uses the information provided by GSGs when it sets one to three years’ priorities in research. 
The GSGs also have the ability to support research related to the local problems they represent.  
 Using the inputs from different sources as explained above, regional panel members and 
GRDC managers at a national level meet in July or August for discussions about priorities and 
investment gaps. Based on the analysis of information, as well as Australian government 
investments priorities, GRDC makes decisions about budget allocations among investment 
themes and investment priorities.  
After discussions regarding GRDC budget allocations amongst investment themes, 
managers provide proposals for targeted R&D investments. Finally, the National Panel made up 
of the chairs of Region Panels and GRDC research managers provides recommendations to the 
board with a final resource allocation plan. The scale of the GRDC allows this organization to 
separate oversight and management decisions, while proactively seeking producer and broader 
industry input at the local and regional level. 
By comparison, the USB, with its statutory board of over 70 members, uses a matrix 
format in the process of decision-making. In this matrix there are four target areas; these are: 
domestic opportunities, international opportunities, supply and communication. There are also 
four action teams: meal, oil, freedom of operation and consumer focus. These action teams are 
based on strategic objectives of USB, these are: increasing the values of soybean meal, 
enhancing the values of soybean oil, facilitating the freedom of operation for farmers and finally 
increasing the quality of soybean products to increase the demand for U.S. soybean. So for each 
target area there are four strategic objectives to follow and action teams are in charge of pursuing 
these targets.   
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In the context of the matrix, board members are first assigned to action teams and then 
within each action team they are divided into smaller groups. These small groups contain three or 
four directors, assigned to the target areas of their action team.  In other words, there are 16 
groups each including three or four directors and each of these small groups becomes an action 
team for target areas. For instance, three or four members of the board of directors are in charge 
of soybean oil in the case of production research (supply).  
In this system, the resource allocation decisions for each target area are made with 
consideration of the issues of similar action teams in the other areas. It means the action teams 
are aware of issues in all of the target areas and they interactively make decisions.   
The issues addressed in the matrix components are used as the preliminary resource for 
allocation decisions. However, primary contractors (Smithbucklin, USSEC and Osborn Barr)3 
provide program briefs related to their area, in which they discuss the constraints, role of USB, 
and issues related to decisions made. In the next step, the directors and staff related to each target 
area meet to discuss the programs in more detail. In this stage, external experts might also be 
invited to discuss the possible outcomes and constraints of these programs. Based on the 
projection of checkoff revenues and other related information, the board makes decisions about 
the allocation of available resources. These individual decisions become the USB’s budget. As 
mandated in the federal marking plan that established the USB, the budget is then reviewed by 
Agriculture Marketing System (AMS) of United State Department of Agriculture (USDA) and if 
AMS approves the budget, the USB will proceed with its plans.    
2.5.2.  Request for Proposal (RFP)   
The RFP stage is an important part of decision-making as it is the main way to identify 
possible investment opportunities. Based on interviews a number of key points became evident.  
Most of the organizations in the sample make request for proposals directly or in partnership 
with other organizations. In addition, there are cases in which the PCROs directly negotiate 
specific projects with the researchers. In the case of GRDC, the researchers have to give up their 
                                                
 
3 By law, USB can only spend up to 3% of its revenue on administration costs. To deal with this constraint, this 
organization has defined three projects to outsource an important part of it administrations activities. These projects 
are related to production research (supply), market development and communication. These projects are contracted 
to Smithbucklin, United Soybean Export Council (USSEC) and Osborn Barr respectively. 
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rights over the ideas presented in their proposals. If the GRDC likes the idea they use them to 
draft a detailed RFP that all competitors can also bid on, before deciding who to fund.  
In the RFP stage, many of the organizations use shorter letters of intent (LOIs) to filter the 
ideas. LOIs are specially used if an organization receives a considerable number of proposals. 
LOIs are also used if there are possibilities of overlapping investments between organizations 
with similar objectives.  
 
Figure 2.3. The request for proposals stage in the decision-making process of PCROs 
The LOIs are usually evaluated by a research committee or similar bodies, the majority of 
the members of these bodies are also organization board members. If the research committees 
accept an idea, then it invites full proposals. In many cases a considerable proportion of LOIs are 
approved by the PCROs and invited for subsequent proposal development.   
The board of directors has two primary roles in the RFP stage. First, it determines the 
priorities that shape the RFPs and then a fraction of the board members that form the majority of 
research committee members make final decisions about the possible investments.  
The sample PCROs made requests for different types of information in the call for 
proposals. However, all of the PCROs in the sample ask the researchers to provide information 
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about the benefits of the research results for producers.  In many cases, the organizations do not 
ask for specific measures of these benefits.  
In the case of Saskatchewan, the Agriculture Development Fund (ADF) plays an important 
role in this process for almost all organizations. In fact, in each year dozens of LOIs are sent to 
ADF and then distribute the related letters to the PCROs of Saskatchewan. In this process 
PCROs and ADF extensively interact with each other to choose amongst the LOIs.    
Among the PCROs sampled, the Iowa Corn Promotion Board (ICPB) does not have RFP 
stage. In this organization the board of directors, with the help of staff, identify the main issues in 
corn production in Iowa and US. After that, the ICPB decides about types of projects that should 
be defined and funded.  
2.5.3.  Review and Ranking of Proposals 
Review and ranking of proposals are also important parts of the decision-making process.  
Appendix A provides detail information about this process of the PCROs in the sample. The 
board of directors in all of the organizations, except GRDC, play crucial roles in reviewing and 
funding proposals. Typically, a subset of directors that are the leading members of the research 
committee reviews the proposals. In this committee, proposals are reviewed and ranked based on 
the pertinent criteria. Also the research committee provides a report for the board of directors by 
which it recommends whether a proposal should be accepted for funding or not. Finally, the 
board of directors makes the final decisions about projects PCROs should fund.   
In different organizations, applicants are supposed to provide different kinds of 
information used for ranking of the projects. In this process, the research committee uses the 
information to rank the proposals against a set of predefined criteria.  
Some of the main criteria used by research committees to rank the proposals are: alignment 
with strategic plans, consistency with substantial ongoing investment programs, benefits to 
farmers, scientific merits, value for money, measures of possible outcomes and the probability of 
success or failure.  
One of the main factors increasing the possibility of funding for a proposal is the presence 
of other parties to co-fund that proposal. For instance, more than 50 percent of GRDC 
investments are in the form of co-funding with other organizations. Similarly, in Saskatchewan 
and many other regions there are the same tendencies amongst the PCROs for co-funding.   
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Figure 2.4. The review and ranking process 
 
Different methods are used to rank the projects. Based on the interviews it is clear that to 
varying extent GRDC, USB, WGRF, ISCP, ICPB and KWC all make their decisions with the aid 
of additive ranking or scoring methods. In some cases minimum scores are used to eliminate 
unsuitable projects, in other cases the scoring is used to rank all of the projects.  
An exception to the additive scoring system is thr economic-based ranking method used by 
ICPB. After the identification of priorities, ICPB uses industry consultants to elaborate on the 
technical issues related to the priorities. Using the priorities and consulting with external experts, 
ICPB defines a handful of projects.  In the next step ICPB, with the help of consultants, conducts 
a preliminary market analysis for the defined projects including market opportunities, volume, 
competition and possible role of the organization. After that ICPB decides who would be the best 
possible research partners. The main criteria used by ICPB to determine which projects to fund 
are market volume, cost of production and patentability of the projects.  
Should
a	Proposal	
be	funded?
Strategic	
plans
Ongoing	
investment	
programs
Benefit(s)	to	
farmers
Value	for	
money
Scientific	
merit(s)
The	presence	
of	co-funding	
parties
Probability	of	
success	
Measures	of	
possible	
outcome(s)
 29 
The remainder of the organizations that are not using a scoring method typically rely on the 
research committee, external advisors or board of directors to choose amongst the projects based 
on a number of factors, where the share of each factor is not explicitly defined.  
2.5.4. Performance Measures 
All of the organizations in the sample measure the performance of individual projects by 
use of interim and final reports. More than half of the organizations interviewed do not measure 
their general performance. 
GRDC uses several methods to evaluate performance. For some of the main programs 
GRDC commissions external experts to assess the ex-post economic impact of investments in 
project levels. Also, GRDC conducts surveys amongst farmers and research partners. Farmer 
surveys are primarily used to determine whether the studies conducted were of benefit to growers 
or not. The research partner surveys are carried out to provide information about the 
effectiveness of GRDC’s relationships with its partners, and they are used to solve possible 
problems in GRDC’s operations. GRDC also provides annual operational plans in which it 
provides measures of its performances in achieving the expected outcomes of investment themes 
and strategies. These measures are based on several reports and surveys provided on a regular 
basis.  
By legislation, USB has to provide ex-post benefit cost analysis of its total investments. 
ISCP and ICPB use key performance measures indicators to evaluate their performances towards 
their objectives. Montana State University provides reports that include information about the 
performance of past and present projects funded by MWBC. These reports are related to 
investments in the cropping system, variety development and disease and weed management. 
2.5.5. Mechanism to Collect Farmers’ Feedback and Research Interests 
In most of the organizations, board of directors’ opinions as industry representatives and 
interaction with other organizations are the two main channels used for collecting information 
about farmers’ needs and research interests. Some of the organizations such as GRDC, ADF and 
GFO conduct surveys to gather information from growers, advisors or scientists about the 
demand for new studies. Some of the organizations such USB and ISCP send their employees in 
the field to collect information.  
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2.6.  Discussion 
As it is indicated so far, with the exception of the GRDC the board of directors of PCROs 
are involved in both oversight and management tasks of these entities. However, this 
observation is in contrast with most of the theories and empirical studies focusing on the 
governance structure of NP and FP organizations (Brown & Guo, 2010; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
LeRoux & Langer, 2016; Miller-Millesen, 2003).  
The roles of directors in NP organizations have been investigated extensively in the 
literature. There are three different types of theories explaining the roles of board of directors in 
NP organizations, they are “agency theory”, “resource dependency theory” and “instructional 
theory” (Miller-Millesen, 2003; Brown, 2005) .  
 Agency theory suggests that management and oversight are supposed to be separated in 
NP organizations even if they do not have residual claimants (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Based on 
agency theory’s implication, the role of board of directors in NP organizations is primarily 
limited to monitoring of managerial decisions and aligning organizational activities toward its 
objectives.  
Resource dependency theory stresses on the role of board of directors in reducing the 
uncertainty of operations in NP organizations by providing different types of information and 
resources (Fligstein & Feeland, 1995).  Under resource dependency theory, the role of board of 
directors is more about providing resources for organizations such as advice, legitimacy, links to 
other organizations and “strategic directions” (Cornforth, 2001; Miller-Millesen, 2003; Brown, 
2005). One of the main resources brought to the NP organizations by the board is strategic 
directions (Bradshaw, Murray, & Wolpin, 1992; Stone & Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 2001).   
   Finally, institutional theory focuses on the rules and norms defining the behaviors and 
roles of board of directors (Zucker, 1987). Institutional theory predicts that organizations of 
similar type or environment (e.g. NP organization, PCROs, etc.) become isomorphic by adopting 
common rules and norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Therefore, one could expect that the role 
of the board of directors in NP organizations may not be related to their characteristics and it is 
the results of the institutional arrangements. 
Although resource dependency theory and institutional theory could provide some useful 
insights about the involvement of the PCROs’ directors, it is suggested that the role of directors 
in these entities could be explained by agency theory. Especially in the context of resource 
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dependency theory, the directors are supposed to provide resources facilitating the managers’ 
decision-making. In other words, the resource dependency theory assumes that the directors and 
the management teams are in charge of two different tasks. However, in the case of PCROs, the 
directors and the managers are both involved in the fulfilling of one task that is making 
investment decisions.  
Furthermore, the “resource dependency theory” simply assumes that the board members 
do not have any personal agenda. In other words, the only factors motivating the board member 
to exert efforts is the success of the organizations, while in “agency theory” one can incorporate 
personal and collective incentives into the behavior of the board of directors of NP organization. 
Now the question is why PCROs do not hire a manager with a potential for high quality of 
decision-making and thus invest farmers’ money properly. Hansmann (1980) suggests that the 
patrons are willing to take over the control of the NP organizations because they will be able to 
control and protect their donations more efficiently. However, it is discussed that as the costs of 
controlling the organizations relative to the marginal benefit of involvement increases, the 
patrons will be less interested in controlling the NP organizations. (Ben-Ner and Van 
Hoomissen 1991; Ben-Ner 1994; Hansmann 1980). Therefore, the directors of PCROs are 
expected to be present in the process of decision-making to 1) make sure the research money is 
spent properly and 2) they gain from their involvement in the process. Thus, the involvement of 
directors suggests that the managers of PCROs are not motivated to exert efforts maximizing 
return on investments and the directors have to be present. In addition, the directors also have 
incentives to participate in the management of these organizations.   
The delgation of the tasks among the agents of an entity have been investigated in task 
delgation literature. Under the moral hazard problem, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) discuss 
that the priniciple will delgate a job to only one agent if it is difficult to measure the contribution 
of each agent separately. The reason behind this choice is that agents will not have motivation to 
exert optimal efforts if they cannot be incentivized based on their individual contributions. On 
the other hand, if the principal can observe the inputs of each party in the team production, she 
hires two agents to perform the tasks (Itoh, 1994).  
In general, in the context of task delegation literature, the important factor determining the 
choice of task delegation is the incentives for exerting efforts. Therefore, if the evaluation of 
output is difficult in a firm, the contracts incentivizing the agents have to be designed so to 
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motivate optimal efforts. (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001; Hallock, 2002; Handy & Katz, 1998; 
Murphy, 1999).  
In a comprehensive study of U.S. public agricultural research investments, Alston et al. 
(2000) showed public agricultural research has measurable impacts 40 years after the investment 
was made, and the peak impact occurs 25 years after the investment was made. With these long 
timelines, delegating the whole decision-making tasks to the manager is a source of moral 
hazard problem. This is because rewarding the manager based on the highly volatile measure of 
the investments’ outcome (i.e. measuring an effect that will be realized after several years) is not 
an optimal tool to motivate the management team. Therefore, the contract rewarding the 
manager should be based on another indication of management team’s efforts. In this case, 
Sappington (1991) suggests that the organizations could use a measure of the manager’s input. 
However, use of such a measure is possible if there is a third party observing the management 
efforts exerted. Hence, it is suggested that the board’s involvement in the decision-making 
process is necessary to incentivize the managers of PCROs.  
Based on the discussion above, one could discuss that the lack of timely observable 
outcomes may result in similar governance structure. Dewaelheyns et al. (2009), in the study of 
nursing homes run by FP, NP and public sectors in Belgium, observed that the level of 
separation between oversight and management are significantly lower in NP nursing homes 
when compared with the for profit counterparts, such that the board of directors in the NP 
nursing homes are highly involved in operational activities. According to the authors the lack of 
separation in NP nursing home is related to the issue of “micro-monitoring.” “Micro-
monitoring” refers to the fact that “boards of directors fails to delegate decision powers on daily 
issues to management and keep decision-making at the level of the supervising bodies instead”  
(Dewaelheyns et al. 2009, pp 189).  
Another case in which the board of directors’ involvement is considerable, is related to the 
venture capitalists (VCs)’ involvement in start-up companies. In this case, the performance of 
start-up companies cannot be measured easily.  
Start-ups may have promising ideas, however these ideas are usually documented in 
patents, thus the realization of revenue in start-ups is accompanied with considerable 
uncertainty.  Therefore, one may suggest that the VCs are likely to look for higher levels of 
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controls in start-ups especially where the returns on investments are accompanied with great 
deal of uncertainty.  
In this context, Kaplan and Stromberg (2002) show that VCs investments in start-ups  give 
them voting rights, board rights and rights on cash flows. However, if the start-ups have proper 
performance, the VCs only keep the cash flow rights and give the other rights up. In addition, if 
the VCs find out that the companies are failing to achieve their goals, they are likely to gain the 
full control. In other words, the VCs’ control over a company’ management is negatively 
associated with the company’ performance.  
The authors also illustrate that the VCs usually use their voting rights to obtain higher 
levels of controls in comparison with the founders or entrepreneurs. In fact, the VCs controls are 
higher than the founding bodies where there is uncertainty concerning the investment results.  
The study by Kaplan and Stromberg (2002) also indicates that as the start-ups’ 
performances become more difficult to measure, the managers or founders’ compensation by 
VCs become less sensitive to the performance measures. Especially in the case of companies in 
which the results might have considerable volatility, the managers’ compensation package is 
more based on “time vesting” payments.  
 Fried, Bruton and Hisrich (1998) show that in comparison with other directors, the board 
members representing VCs play more active roles in the board of directors of start-ups. The 
same results can be found in Rosenstein, Bruno, Bygrave and Taylor (1993) showing that the 
involvement of directors representing VCs is significantly more than other board members 
where VCs are the lead investors of the start-ups. Similarly Deakins, O’Neill and Mileham 
(2000) suggest that the board’s roles in small start-ups is not just limited to the oversight tasks.   
To sum up, it is suggested there are rationales behind the apparent anomaly observed in 
the governance structure of PCROs. The governance structure of PCROs is plausibly explained 
by the presence of an agency problem.  In a comprehensive study of U.S. public agricultural 
research investments, Alston et al. (2011) show public agricultural research has measurable 
impacts 40 years after the investment is made, and the peak impact occurs 25 years after the 
investment was made. Similarly, in the case of the PCROs, investment outcomes are realized 
several years after the investments are made. Therefore, assigning the whole decision-making 
task to the manager is a possible source of an agency problem.  
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If the manager’s performance is measured with a great deal of delay and uncertainty, the 
manager may not provide an optimal effort, as he is not incentivized properly. In addition, the 
PCROs may not be able to hire the managers with high quality decision-making skills. 
Moreover, the manager is likely to direct resources towards the projects whose returns are 
realized in the short-run. Thus, the PCROs will have an unbalanced investment portfolio and fail 
to fulfill their missions.  
Therefore, because the PCROs are complex organizations (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and as 
their directors have high opportunity costs to allocate most of their time in the PCROs, these 
entities have to hire managers with high quality decision-making skills. However, the nature of 
investments in PCROs and long horizon investments in them are the important sources of 
agency problem. Thus, the directors as the patrons have to be involved in the management 
decisions to provide proper incentives for the management team and direct investments to the 
areas benefiting other patrons.   
2.7. Concluding Remarks 
Using a series of interviews with the managers or directors of fourteen organizations 
involved in agricultural R&D, this chapter reviewed and compared the governance structure and 
the decision-making processes of PCROs. In the context of case-study methodology, this chapter 
highlights some of the main features of the PCROs governance structures and decision-making 
process. It also provides a background for the PCROs in the context of literature and indicates 
that the cases studied could be used to generate theories around the governance of PCROs.  
Based on property rights structure and the characteristics of the directors of PCROs, these 
organizations should be defined as NP organizations. Following Hansmann (1980), this chapter 
also classified the PCROs. In the sample, with the exception of a single organization (GRDC), 
the rest are considered as donative-mutual NP organizations because farmers fund and govern 
these organizations. There are also several PCROs in the sample that commercialize the results 
of their investments and therefore they can be classified as commercial-mutual NP organizations. 
In most of PCROs, farmers directly elect the directors of these NP organizations. However, 
in four PCROs government officials, following the nomination by regional agricultural sector 
organizations, appoint the directors. In most of the organizations, the directors are elected or 
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appointed based on their local attachment or crop districts. In the case of Saskatchewan, the 
regional attachment does not play any role in the determination of board members directly.  
The chapter also distinguished between five stages of decision-making in the sample 
PCROs: determination of priorities, request for proposals (RFP), review and ranking of 
proposals, measuring performance and finally collecting information about grower feedback and 
their research interests.  
Interestingly, in contrast to the theories and several empirical studies, the directors in 13 
out of 14 PCROs in the sample play crucial roles in making managerial decisions. It is posited 
that the governance structure of PCROs stems from an agency problem. 
Based on the interview responses it appears the PCROs use different methods to rank 
projects. To varying degrees GRDC, USB, WGRF, ISCP, ICPB and KWC make their decisions 
through explicit ranking mechanisms. The exception is ICPB, which for the most part, uses an 
economic-based ranking method. When using explicit ranking methods, projects are usually 
reviewed and ranked based on additive ranking or scoring methods. Also, the rest of the 
organizations usually rely on a research committee, external advisors or board of directors to 
choose amongst the projects where the share of each factor is not explicitly defined.  
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Chapter 3: Who Governs Producer Controlled Research Organizations in the 
Agricultural sector, and Why? 
3.1. Introduction 
P roducer controlled research organizations (PCROs)4 in the agricultural sector are charged 
with the task of investing millions of dollars of checkoff revenues in  R&D and promotion 
projects. These organizations came into existence because both the public and private sectors 
failed to invest in agricultural R&D sufficiently and efficiently (Alston et al., 2012). Previous 
studies show that PCROs’ investments usually yield substantial rates of return, often over very 
long time horizons (Alston, Chan-Kang, Marra, Pardey, & Wyatt, 2000; Gray & Scott, 2003 ) 
suggesting PCROs could notably improve the welfare of farmers and consumers. Regarding the 
significance of PCROs in the improvement of producers and consumers’ well-being, it is 
important to know how the decisions are made in these organizations and by whom.  
 To the best of my knowledge, the governance structure and decision-making process of 
these organizations have not been studied systematically. To begin to fill this gap, a series of 
interviews was conducted with the managers and directors of fourteen PCROs across Australia, 
the United States and Canada to evaluate the governance structure and decision-making process 
of these organizations.5 During these interviews, it became clear that the boards of directors play 
important roles in the governance of PCROs and are both involved in the management and 
oversight decisions. This observation is in contrast with most of the theories and empirical 
studies focusing on the governance structure of NP and FP organizations (Brown & Guo, 2010; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Miller-Millesen, 2003).  
Given this apparent anomaly, this chapter poses and attempts to answer to the following 
question: Why do PCROs tend to assign a substantial portion of managerial decisions to their 
                                                
 
4 Throughout the dissertation I use PCROs to refer to producer controlled research organization whose 
main roles are to develop and promote agriculture commodities using levies paid by farmers.   
5 The results of these interviews are presented in the previous chapter. 
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boards of directors instead of managers? To answer this question, a theoretical model is 
developed that is based on agency theory with focus on task(s) delegation literature (Bester & 
Krähmer, 2008; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Itoh, 1994; Riordan & Sappington, 1987). The 
model considers a PCRO whose primary job is to maximize the return on agricultural producers’ 
levies by investing them into R&D and market promotion projects. Based on this objective 
function, the PCRO decides to assign the decision-making task to the manager or the board of 
directors.  
In the model, the manager and the board of director are considered as the agents of the 
PCRO that have different motivations for exerting efforts. The directors of the PCROs as 
farmers or agricultural sector beneficiaries receive monetary benefits from the PCRO’s 
investments proportional to their share of the industry. In addition, it is assumed that a director’s 
utility can be positively affected through altruism and learning in the process of decision-
making6.  
In contrast to the board of directors, the manager exerts effort in return for financial 
compensation. The compensation package of the manager in this model includes a base salary 
and a bonus. The bonus paid using some performance measure of output or expertise and effort 
of the manager. Arguably the very long research lags and the lack of a market valuation of the 
non-profit research portfolio could preclude any timely measurement of output for the PCRO. 
Therefore, manager’s compensation based on a measure of PCRO’s outcome(s) may not be a 
proper tool to incentivize the manager (Sappington, 1991). For organizations willing to measure 
the input of managers and reward them accordingly, the presence of a third party (e.g. the board 
of directors) could potentially improve the accuracy of such a measure by reducing the variance 
of the performance measure. 
Given the PCRO’s objective and the characteristics of the agents, the organization decides 
whether to assign the task of decision-making to directors or the manager. This choice is 
determined by several factors, including the characteristics of the directors, the knowledge 
levels of the manager and board members, and the ability to incentivize the effort of the 
manager based on the imperfectly measured output or decision-making input.   
                                                
 
6 Some PCRO’s pay their directors a nominal per diem that is assumed to be trivial.  
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In the case of an output-based bonus, the results of the model suggest the PCRO decides to 
assign the task to either the almost perfectly incentivized manager or directors, depending on 
their relative effectiveness. A separation of decision-making and oversight would exist in this 
case, over a range of plausible parameter values. However, when the manager’s reward is based 
on his input, given similar characteristics of the directors and the manager, the shared decision is 
more likely to be the norm if the directors are not significantly altruistic. However, if the board 
members are highly altruistic, the PCRO decides to share the decision-making contingent upon 
the superiority of manager’s input quality, including knowledge level or cost of exerting efforts.  
In these situations, the directors will generally also participate in management in order to both 
incentivize managerial effort and help the PCRO to reach its objectives. These results, which 
will be derived in the remainder of this chapter, provide a useful theoretical framework to model 
PCROs decision-making.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2, there is a brief review 
some of the previous studies, Section 3 presents some features of PCROs governance structures, 
based on interviews. Section 4 discusses the manager’s compensation package and output 
observability in PCROs. The theoretical model is presented in Section 5 and the chapter 
conclusion is in Section 6.   
3.2. Review of Previous Studies: 
There are three theories used in explaining the roles of the board of directors in NP 
organizations; these theories are institutional theory, resource dependency theory and agency 
theory (Miller-Millesen, 2003; Brown, 2005). Although one could use the institutional theory 
and resource dependency theory to explain the assignment of management decisions to the 
board of directors by PCROs, in this paper I focus on the agency theory to account for this 
observation. This is because agency theory implies the separation of management and oversight, 
however this observation is in contrast with such implications. Therefore, given the 
characteristics of the PCROs presented in the previous chapter, I examine whether the agency 
theory can explain the lack of oversight and management tasks’ separation or not.  
Agency theory implies that the roles of the board of directors in NP organization are 
primarily limited to monitoring of managers and aligning organizational activities toward its 
objectives ( Fama & Jensen, 1983; Miller-Millesen, 2003). However, the broader principal-agent 
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literature suggests the delegation of tasks can be influenced by information asymmetries. The 
literature suggests the principal would delegate a job to one agent if it was hard to measure the 
performance of each agent separately (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). The reason behind this 
choice is that agents are not motivated to exert optimal efforts if they cannot be incentivized 
based on their individual performances. On the other hand, if the principal can observe the 
inputs of each party in the team’s production, she hires more than one agent to perform the tasks 
(Itoh, 1994). Moreover, the delegation of authority to an agent over choosing a project may not 
be an optimal choice, especially if the agent is secured against his action by limited liability 
constraint (Bester & Krähmer, 2008). Furthermore, if there is information asymmetry, the 
choice of the delegation of tasks to agents, is the function of the correlation between the costs of 
performing the tasks ( Riordan & Sappington, 1987).  
3.3. Decision-Making Process and Governance Structure of PCROs: mutual or 
enterprenurial 
Hansmann (1980) discusses that the patrons of NP organizations have tendency to exercise 
some degrees of control over the NP organizations because they can trace their contributions in 
these entities. This is specially the case where patrons consume the products of NP organizations 
on a regular basis. Hansmann (1980) differentiates between four types of NP organizations 
based on funding sources and the agent(s) who control(s) these entities.  The parties that fund 
the NP organizations by their donations are called “patrons”. According to Hansmann (1980) 
NP organizations can be controlled by their patrons or they can hire others to run the NP 
enterprises. The former, controlled by patrons, are classified as “mutual” and the latter as 
“entrepreneurial” NP organizations.   
However, the patrons will not have the tendency to participate in NP organizations’ 
control (i.e. the organization shifts from mutual to entrepreneurial governance structure) if the 
marginal benefit of the participation in governance of NP organizations is smaller than the 
marginal cost of allocating time and resources (Ben-Ner, 1994; Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, 
1991; Hansmann, 1980).  
Given Hansmann’s classification of NP organizations, one purpose of this chapter is to 
provide a theoretical explanation behind the choice of mutual or entrepreneurial governance 
structure. Hence, in this section the governance structure of PCROs in the sample are shortly 
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reviewed. The information provided below will be used later in this chapter to develop the 
analytical model providing a possible explanation of why PCROs choose to be a mix of mutual 
and entrepreneurial types of NP organizations.  
The primary purpose of the PCROs is to invest collected levies into R&D and market 
promotion projects to benefit the producers. Managers or elected/appointed directors run the 
PCROs. In other words, the PCROs are a combination of mutual and entrepreneurial NP 
organizations. These organizations rarely own any agricultural research facilities and primarily 
rely on research entities such as universities or private companies involved in the agricultural 
research. Therefore, the PCROs could be considered as funding bodies allocating their resources 
to proposed research. In other words, the PCROs do not have to incur substantial fixed costs for 
their investment decisions and their main cost component is the variable costs of their agents’ 
compensations.  
Although there might be some differences in the process of decision-making of PCROs 
interviewed, the investment decisions are usually made according to a similar process in these 
organizations. In most of the cases, the PCROs first determine their research priorities and then 
the researchers from universities or private research entities are invited to propose research 
projects. The proposals are evaluated by the research committees, encompassing directors (i.e. 
patrons) and research managers. The research committees use member expertise or external 
reviewers’ reports to provide a recommendation for the board about each proposal.  
Research committee recommendations are usually based on the PCRO’s research 
priorities, the value of the projects in terms of the potential benefit to farmers, scientific 
feasibility and other criteria. By use of these guidelines, the board that only includes the elected 
or appointed patrons decides whether to fund a proposal or not.  
Although the process of decision-making explained above might be similar to other 
organizations in terms of the stages of the decision-making, the outcomes of the interviews and 
comparison with other studies (Brown & Guo, 2010; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Miller-Millesen, 
2003) indicate that there is a significant difference between PCROs and other NP and for-profit 
entities. In fact, in all of the PCROs (except GRDC), the directors are assigned significant 
responsibilities in more-or-less every stage of decision-making. In other words, the directors are 
not just in charge of oversight, they are also involved in management decisions, this includes 
determining the priorities, reviewing and ranking the proposals, making investment decisions 
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and reflecting farmer feedback and research interests. This structure of control suggests that the 
PCROs primarily are classified as mutual and entrepreneurial and they are mostly located near 
the mutual end of the spectrum.  
In return for the directors’ efforts, they either receive nominal per diem payments, or they 
are not compensated at all. However, a director could receive three types of compensations by 
both being a farmer and exerting efforts in the PCROs: 1) The directors are agricultural sector 
beneficiaries and they gain from PCROs investments proportional to the size of their own 
business. 2) The interviewees expressed several times during the interviews that directors care 
about other farmers. In other words, it seems that altruism plays a key role in incentivizing 
directors to spend effort in PCROs. Given this observation and by following Besley and Ghatak 
(2005) one could assume directors could be mission-oriented agents, motivated to exert efforts 
in the PCROs because they care about a PCRO and its beneficiaries. 3) The interviews also 
support considering a director might benefit as a results of his/her involvement in the decision-
making process of a PCRO by learning about new technologies and business opportunities. This 
knowledge is achieved in the course of making investment decisions implying that the board 
members gain additional utility by exerting extra efforts. In other words, the considerable 
involvement of the directors in PCROs suggests that they gain a marginal benefit by extra 
efforts that they exert in the PCROs. This extra benefit is expected to be greater than the 
marginal costs of their involvement.  
In sum it was observed that the PCROs are a mix of mutual and entrepreneurial NP 
organizations while the weight of patrons in controlling these enterprises re are notably higher 
than the managers. In addition, since the directors are the beneficiaries of PCROs, they use the 
products of these organizations on a regular bases and the net benefit of their involvement is 
greater than zero. However, it should be noted that the positive gain for the directors is not 
necessarily monetary as they might be motivated by other factors such as altruism.   
3.4. Manager’s Compensation Packages and Output Observability in PCROs 
In comparison with the directors, the managers of PCROs sampled did not have any 
farming activities. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the managers exert efforts primarily for 
financial incentives. However agricultural research typically has a very long gestation lag 
(Alston et al., 2011). A comprehensive study of U.S. public agricultural research investments 
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showed public agricultural research has measurable impacts 40 year after the investment was 
made, and the peak impact occurs 25 years after the investment is made (Alston et al., 2011). 
With these long timelines, rewarding manager performance based on research outcomes might 
not be practical. Therefore a contract incentivizing a manager where the observation of output is 
considerably noisy (which is the case in PCROs) could differ from what the private sector offers 
to executives (Fulton & Pohler, 2015; Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001; Roomkin & Weisbrod 1999).  
In NP organizations, the compensation packages provided to the managers often include 
both base salary and bonus payments (Hallock, 2002). However, the managers of NP 
organizations receive considerably less total compensation in comparison with for-profit 
organizations (Hallock, 2002; Handy & Katz, 1998; Roomkin & Weisbrod, 1999). The lower 
levels of payments to the managers of the NP organizations in comparison with FP enterprises is 
related to lack of non-distribution constraints and difficulties in measuring the performance of 
the management team (Preyra & Pink, 2001) 
In the private sector there are different types of incentives offered to a manager, including 
base salary, bonus payment, stock options and long-run performance incentives. In the case of 
bonuses, the companies in the private sector use one or more than one performance measures to 
reward their managers (Murphy, 1999). The performance evaluation methods used in private 
enterprises include accounting performance measures (i.e. some measures of profit or income) 
and “non-financial” performance measures. The most frequently used non-financial performance 
measure is “individual performance,” measured according to pre-determined objectives and 
subjective evaluations of the manager’s individual performance (Murphy, 1999).  
Using a series of interviews with managers of fifteen cooperatives, Hueth and Marcoul 
(2009) show co-ops use different payment schemes for rewarding managers through the use of 
bonuses. The authors suggest the use of implicit contracts is common in co-ops. Also the authors 
hypothesize, as the directors in co-ops have a better understanding of the managers’ real efforts, 
they could at least partially reward the managers based on the direct observation of efforts. 
However, their interviews imply that this hypothesis can be rejected, as they observed the 
directors are not actively involved in the management decisions.  
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3.5. Theoretical Model 
The model presented in this section is based on the following scenario: the objective 
function of the PCRO is to maximize the present expected value of the research investments, /, 
minus investment costs, minus operating costs, which are invariant to the decision-making 
process and include fixed wage and bonus payments to the manager.  
The model assumes the value of output from the decision-making function is as follows: 
the quality of the research decision, measured in terms of /, made by an agent 0 (M and B) is 
product of his knowledge level, 12 and effort, 32.  The quality of the research decision of the 
PCRO is an average of the quality of the research decision making of  directors, 3414, and the 
quality of the decisions making of the manager 3515 weighted by the 6 and 1 − 	6 where 6	∈	 0,1 . 
  / = 6	3414 + 1 − 6 3515………………………………………………………………………… 3.1  
These choices of the PCRO are taken into account in two different scenarios. In the first 
scenario, I assume the PCRO’s output is measureable and in the second scenario I assume 
because of the friction in measuring the PCRO’s outcomes, the organization rewards the 
manager based on a measure of his input.  
The PCRO makes the choices in a three-stages game. In the first stage, the PCRO chooses 
the weight of each agent, the board of directors and the manager, in the decision-making 
process. In the second stage, the PCRO decides about the components of the payment scheme. 
In the third stage, the manager and directors both as risk neutral agents, choose the amounts of 
effort that they are going to expend in the course of decision-making.  
3.5.1. Rewarding the manager based on a measure of output. 
The manager’s reward, in terms of the bonus, could be based on the output of the 
organization (e.g. profit or in the case of PCROs additional yield for farmers or return on 
investments). Therefore, the stages of the game are as follows: 
Stage 3:  
In the third stage of the game, the manager and directors decide about the levels of efforts 
they are going to exert in the PCRO. As previously mentioned the PCRO’s output is / =6	3414 + 1 − 6 3515. However, following Alston et al. (2011) it is assumed that the outcome 
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is not observable in the short-run. Therefore, the PCRO has to use a performance measure to 
evaluate the value generated by investments. This value is assessed by the performance measure 
of =>. In this case, the setup presented in Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) is used to specify 
the implication of performance measure on the choice of agents’ weights in the decision-making 
process. It is assumed that => on average yields an unbiased measure of outcome (? => = 1). 
However, there are some years in which => renders a higher (lower) measure of the output, 
implying that the payment to the manager is proportionally higher (lower) than the manager’s 
contribution. In other words, measure of the performance has some variance indicated by @>A  
(BCD => = @>A).  
Therefore, in each year, the PCRO observes / = =>. / and it pays the bonus of E per unit 
of /. The manager also receives the fixed salary of F. Following Baker et al., (1994) it is 
assumed that the manager only knows there is a performance measure in the PCRO, however he 
can only realize the mechanism of => when he starts to work in the organization and not before 
accepting the contract. In this setting, although the manager is risk neutral he will have to be 
compensated for the uncertainty of the performance measure in terms of the fixed payment 
because of the incomplete information about the performance measure’s mechanism. 
The manager receives	F + E	/ and incurs the cost of 1 2 G535A . Thus, the net utility of the 
manager because of exerting efforts in the PCRO is indicated in equation (3.2):  H5 = F + E	/ − 12 G535A ……………………………………………………………………. 3.2  
        
The manager maximizes (3.2) with respect to 35 that is: maxLM H5 = F + E	/ − NA G535A    
Consequently, the efforts exerted by the manager is shown in equation (3.3):  35∗ = 15G5 E=> 1 − 6 ……………………………….………………………………………	 3.3  
         
Equation (3.3) denotes optimal effort of the manager is a positive function of his 
knowledge (15), bonus of E and weights of manager in the process of decision-making that is 1 − 6 . It is also assumed that the manager’s reservation wage is equal to R, therefore, the 
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lowest amount of expected F	satisfying manager’s participation’s constraint is shown in 
equation (3.4) and this is the optimal base salary that PCRO pays to the manager.  ? F = ? R − E	/ + 12 G535A ……………………………………………………………… 3.4  
         
  Taking the expected value from both side one can write equation (3.4) as follows ? F =R − E/ +	(15A 2	G5)EA 1 − 6 A? => A. Considering the assumptions that E αV = 1 and Var αV = σVA gives E αVA = 1 + σVA resulting in: ? F = R − E/ +	 15A (2	G5) EA 1 −6 A(1 + @>A). Therefore, although the manager is assumed to be risk-neutral, since he has 
quadratic cost function, as the friction of the organization’s performance measure increases, the 
PCRO should offer the manager higher fixed payment to satisfy his participation constraint. 
Based on the PCRO’s payment to the manager, the organization’s expected profit is shown in 
equation (3.5):  ? Y = 63414 + 1 − 6 3515 − R − 12 G5?[35A ] ………………………………………… 3.5  
   
The board members are the beneficiaries of the industry research and market development. 
Therefore, their utility is positively associated with the returns on the PCRO’s investments. The 
interviews also support the supposition the board members’ altruism and learning capacity 
positively affect their incentives.  H4 = \ + ]	 1 − \ Y + 	^. \. 63414 − 12 G434A…………………………………………… 3.6  
     
In equation (3.6) \ ∈ 	 [0,1] is the share of the board member from the industry. So if a 
director is a farmer, \ could be considered as the relative size of his/her farm to the industry. 
Following Besley and Ghatak (2005) it is assumed that  directors could be mission-oriented 
agents and they are motivated to exert efforts in the PCROs by both pecuniary (\ and ^ ≥ 0) 
and non-pecuniary (]) factors. Hence, a board member could also consider the factor of ] ∈	 0,1  as the degree by which he/she values the success of the rest of the industry members. It 
implies the higher values of ] correspond with higher efforts exerted by the directors. For 
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instance, if ] = 1 a director exerts efforts in the PCRO as if he or she owns the whole industry 
while if ] = 0, the effort of the director will be only proportional to \.  
Directors also gain from involvement in the PCROs’ activities in the form of learning 
about new technologies, networking opportunities and so on. This gain is indicated by parameter ^ ≥ 0 that is proportional to the directors’ input and weight attached to it in the decision-making 
process and their share of industry (i.e. ^. \. 63414). Finally, 1 2 G434A is the cost of exerting 
efforts incurred by board of directors. The directors maximize (3.7) with respect to 34 that is:   maxLa H4 = \ + ]	(1 − \) Y + 	^. \. 6. 3414 − NA G434A  
 34∗ = bca defefg Nheia …………………………………………………………….………… 3.7  
 
A board member’s optimal effort illustrated in equation (3.7) is an increasing function of 6, ^, \, ], 14 and decreasing function of his/her marginal cost of exerting efforts.  
Stage 2: 
In this stage of the game, PCROs determine the optimal bonus of E and F by maximizing 
its expected return: maxk ? Y = ? 63414 + 1 − 6 3515 − R − 12 G535A …………………….…………… 3.8  
      
Substituting equations (3.3) and (3.7) into (3.8) we have:  maxk 	? Y = ? E=> cMmiM 1 − 6 A +	bmcam defefg Nheia − R − NA EA=>A cMmiM 1 − 6 A 		.  
 
that based on the expected values is: maxk ? Y =E cMmiM 1 − 6 A +	bmcam defefg Nheia − R − NA EA(1 + @>A) cMmiM 1 − 6 A   
 
The first order condition of the PCRO’s problem in the second stage of the game is:  						no pnk = cMmiM 1 − 6 A − E 1 + @>A cMmiM 1 − 6 A = 0  
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Solving for E, we get to the optimal outcome-based bonus paid to the manager shown in 
equation (3.9):  E∗ = 11 + @>A ….………………….………………………………………………………………. 3.9  
        
Equation (3.9) implies that, as the variance of the performance measure increases, the 
manager’s payment decreases, weakening incentives for exerting efforts in the PCRO.  
Taking into account the nature of investments’ return in agriculture R&D it is known that 
the outcomes of these types of investments are usually realized several years after the 
investments are made, suggesting that the use of any ex-ante performance measure could be 
accompanied with considerable variance. Therefore, one may discuss that the managers of 
PCROs will be less incentivized, when compared to other types of organizations, if they are 
rewarded based on the outcome of investments.  
Also, the first-best effort level of the manager is 35∗∗ = 1 − 6 15/G5 where in presence 
of the noise in evaluation of the outcome (i.e. @>A) the effort of the manager is 35∗ =1 − 6 15 [G5. 1 + @>A ]	. Therefore, the higher variance of output performance measures 
distracts the manager from expending 35∗∗.  
In addition, the performance measure of => does not measure the contribution of each 
agent in the investment decision made. Therefore, if the decisions are made by both the manager 
and the board of directors (i.e. 6 ∈ 0,1 ). The manager could act as a free rider or lose his 
incentives if his contribution is not realized separately.  
Stage 1: 
In this stage, the PCRO determines the weight of each agent’s input into the decision-
making process. By substituting (3.9) into (3.8) we have:  Y∗ 6, … = 12 11 + @A 1 − 6 A15AG5 + 6A14A ^\ + \ + ]	 1 − \G4 − R……….…….. 3.10  
      
Equation (3.10) implies that the return function of the PCRO is convex in 6. In other 
words, because the efforts of the agents are directly associated with their input weights (i.e. 6 
and 1 − 6), therefore, each agent is willing to have higher weight in the process and the PCROs’ 
has to employ only one of the agents for making the investment decisions. Therefore, the ideal 
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value of 6 in this case is either equal to zero or one. In other words, the PCRO has to assign the 
decision-making authority only to one of the agents.  
For instance, if 6∗ = 1, therefore the board will be in charge and Y∗ 6 = 1,… = 14A ^\ + \ + ]	 1 − \ G4 − R which in terms of the board’s optimal input is equal to 34∗14 − R. Similarly, if 6∗ = 0,		the manager becomes the decision-making agent and Y∗ 6 =0,… = 1 (1 + @A) 15A 2	G5 − R which is equal to 1/2	35∗ 15 − R. Therefore, if 1/235∗ 15 > 34∗14,  the manager becomes in charge of the decision making, otherwise the PCRO 
assigns the job to the board of directors. In other words, if the relative quality of the research 
decision-making of the manager is defined as  35∗ 15/34∗14, the board of directors will become 
the decision-making agent if its decision-making quality is two times more than that of the 
manager, otherwise the PCRO will delegate the decision-making to the manager and 6∗ = 0. 
One can also rewrite equation (3.10) as follows:  Y	 = tm Nhb m5Nfuvm + w. x. 6A − R  
where y = cMmiM , x = camia , w = ^\ + \ + ]	 1 − \ . Based on this new format, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 
plot the expected return of the PCRO against the weight of the board in the decision-making 
process where in the first figure the w = 1 and in the second figure w = 1/100. In other words, 
in Figure 3.1 the directors are assumed to be highly altruistic while in the Figure 3.2 they only 
care about themselves.  
As it is indicated in Figure 3.1, where the board is notably altruistic, the PCRO prefers to 
assign the decision-making task to the manager if his knowledge level is higher than that of the 
board or if it is less costly for him to exert effort (i.e. y = 3). In other words, for lower values 
of y the PCRO’s choice of 6 is equal to one.   
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Figure 3.1.  The choice of z where { = |/|}, ~Ä = |/|}, Å = |,Ç = | 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. The choice of z where { = |/|}, ~Ä = |/|}, Å = |/|}},Ç = | 
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However, in Figure 3.2 we have w = 1 100 that is the board members primarily care 
about their share of industry. As it is shown in Figure 3.2, in the presence of self-interested 
board, even if the manager’ input characteristics including knowledge or marginal costs are 
much lower than the that of the board (i.e. y = 1/4) the PCRO still prefers the manager over 
the board. In other words, altruism is the primary feature of the board that could stimulate the 
organization to use the board instead of the manager.  
Given Haussmann’s categorization of NP organizations one could discuss that if the 
manager rewards are based on the outcome of PCROs’ investments, the PCROs’ control status 
will be either mutual or entrepreneurial.   
3.5.2. Rewarding the manager based on a measure of input.  
A compensation plan encompassing reward based on a measure of input could be a more 
operative tool to incentivize the manager where there are noteworthy frictions in measuring the 
output (Sappington, 1991). However, measuring the manager’s contribution is contingent upon 
the presence of a third party evaluating his input. In the model this third party is the board of 
directors. In this setting, the board of directors is involved in the decision-making along with the 
manager and it also assesses the quality of decision-making of the manager, and the PCRO 
rewards him accordingly. In this scenario it is assumed the involvement of the board of directors 
in the decision-making process affects the performance measure of the manager’s input through 
lessening the discrepancy of the performance measure.   
Stage 3:  
In this stage of the game the manager and the board adopt the levels of efforts they are 
going to exert in the PCRO. The PCRO’s output (i.e. / = 6	3414 + 1 − 6 3515) is realized 
through the combination of the board and manager efforts, enhanced by their knowledge levels. 
The payment of the premium to the manager is conditional upon the measurement of the quality 
of his input into the decision-making (i.e. 3515). Therefore, the presence of the board of 
directors in the process of decision-making improves the quality of the performance measure (i.e. 
it reduces the variance of the performance measure). Equation (3.11) denotes the net utility of the 
manager where he is rewarded based on the quality of his input.  H5 = F + É=L	3515 − 12 G535A ……………………………………………………..….. 3.11  
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In equation (3.11), F is the base salary paid to the manager. In addition, the manager 
receives É per unit of input exerted. However, 3515 is assessed by a performance measure (i.e. =L) that on average yields an unbiased measure of 3515. This performance measure 
encompasses some noises. However, the size of the variance is reduced by the presence of the 
board of directors in the course of the decision-making. In other words, =L~(1, @LA 6) implying 
that as the weight of the board of directors in the process of decision-making rises, =L measures 
the 3515 with more precision. However, if 6 approaches zero, the use of this evaluation method 
will not be plausible.  
Following Baker et al., (1994) I suppose the manager only knows there is a performance 
measure in the PCRO, however he does not know how =L works before accepting the offer. The 
manager maximizes (3.11) with respect to 35 and consequently the effort that he is going to 
exert is shown in equation (3.12)    35∗ = É=L 15G5 ………….…………………………………………………………………. 3.12  
 Equation (3.12) denotes that optimal effort of the manager is a positive function of his 
knowledge (15), bonus of É, and the weight of the board in the decision made. Comparable to 
the previous case, the board of directors’ optimal effort is: 34∗ = 614 ^\ + \ + ] 1 − \G4 …………………………………………………………. 3.13  
Stage 2: 
In this stage of the game, the PCRO determines the optimal bonus É and the base salary of F by maximizing its expected yield: maxÖ ? Y = ? 63414 + 1 − 6 3515 − R − 12 G535A ……………………………… 3.14  
       
Substituting equations (3.12) and (3.13) into (3.14) the PCRO maximizes (3.15) with 
respect to É: 
 
maxÖ ? Y = 		 Nhb 	Ö	b	cMmiM + bmcam dfefg	 Nheia − NA Öm NfÜámà bmcMmiM − R………………….… 3.15  
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The first order condition of PCRO’s maximization problem in determination of É is: 
no pnÖ = Nhb 	b	cMmiM − Ö NfÜámà bmcMmiM = 0. Therefore, the optimal input-based bonus paid to the 
manager is:  É∗ = 1 − 6 66 + @LA ………………………………………………………………………..……. 3.16  
            
In this situation, the expected optimal effort of the manager is ? 35∗ = 1 − 6 615/( @LA + 6 G5). Comparing this level of effort with the first-best effort level that is 35∗∗ =1 − 6 15/G5 one can see that as @LA increases, the manager’s effort diverts from first-best 
effort level.  
Figure 3.3 plots the optimal bonus paid to the manager against the weight given to the 
board, in the process of decision-making. The optimal input-based bonus paid to the manager is 
the increasing function of the manager’s weight in the process and decreasing function of @LA, 
however as the weight of the board of directors increases the negative impact of @LA on the size 
of the bonus will decline. 
 
Figure 3.3. Optimal bonus paid to the manager based on the variance of input 
performance measure. 
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Stage 1: 
In this stage, the PCRO determines the weight of each agent’s input into the decision-
making process. By substituting (3.16) into (3.15) we have:  
Y∗ . = 1 − 6 A615AG5 6 + @LA + 6A14A ^\ + \ + ]	 1 − \G4 − R − 12 1 − 6 A6A 1 + @L
A6 15AG5 6 + @LA … 3.17  
This equation can be written in the form of equation (3.18)  Y∗ . = y2 1 − 6 A66 + @LA + wx6A − R……………………………………………………… 3.18  
       
where in equation (3.18) y = 15A /G5, x = 14A/G4 and w = ^\ + \ + ]	 1 − \ . To illustrate 
the choice of PCRO’s optimal solution of 6 (weight of the board of directors in the decision-
making process) we use the of plot Y∗ .  against 6. 
The choice of z in the presence of highly altruistic board 
Let’s assume that the board of directors is highly altruistic or ] = 1 so if the board does 
not learn anything in the process of decision-making, w will be equal to one. Figure 3.4 and 3.5 
plot the expected return of the PCRO against the board’s weight in the process of decision-
making where R = 1 10 , w = 1 and x = 1. The only difference between these two figures is 
the value of @LA , where in Figure 3.4 it is equal to 1 10 and in Figure 3.5 it is equal to 1 5.  In 
this figure I am looking for the choice of 6 where manager’s characteristics of input (y =15A /G5) varies.  
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Figure 3.4. The choice of z where { = |/|}, ~Ä = |/|}, Å = |,Ç = | 
 
 
Figure 3.5. The choice of z where { = |/|}, ~Ä = |/â, Å = |,Ç = | 
As it is indicated in Figure 3.4 and 3.5, in the presence of highly altruistic board, the 
PCRO uses both manager and the board if y is considerably higher than x. In addition, if @LA 
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increases, as it is illustrated in Figure 3.5, the manager’s input characteristics now should be 
even higher than in the case of figure 3.4 so the PCRO decides to share the decision-making 
task. In other words, the PCRO prefers to share the decision-making between the board of 
directors and manager if the manager’s qualities are considerably higher than those of the board, 
otherwise the PCRO only use the board to make the investment decisions.   
In the context of Hansmann’s classification, the results in here suggest that if the board is 
vastly altruistic, the PCRO’ s governance structure will be a mix of mutual and entrepreneurial 
if the manager’ s quality of decision-making is higher than the directors. However, if this is not 
the case the PCRO will be classified just as a mutual entity.   
The choice of z in the presence of a self-centered board 
Now a situation is considered in which the board only cares about itself and altruism does 
not play any role in board’s incentives for exerting efforts in the process of decision-making.  
In Figure 3.6 and 3.7 I take into account the case of selfish board in which w = 1 100. 
Similar to Figures 3.4 and 3.5 the choices of 6 for two different values of @LA that are 1 10 and 1 5 are taken in to consideration respectively.  
 
Figure 3.6. The choice of z where { = |/|}, ~äÄ = |/|}, Å = |/|}},Ç = | 
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Figure 3.7. The choice of z where { = |/|}, ~äÄ = |/|}, Å = |/|}},Ç = | 
 
In Figures 3.6 and 3.7, if the board of directors does not much care about the rest of the 
industry, the PCRO is willing to share the decision-making between the board and the manager. 
In Figure 3.6, the PCRO shares the decision-making task even if y is half of x. However, in 
Figure 3.7, because @LA is two times larger than that of figure 3.6, the manager’s input quality 
(including knowledge and cost of exerting efforts) should be close to that of the board. 
Therefore, in the presence of a non-altruistic board, the PCRO has to find a manager that is at 
least as good as the board.  
To sum up we can now have an explanation about the conditions that may lead to the 
shared decision-making in PCROs. In other words the results of the theoretical model developed 
have implications about why PCROs adopt a governance structure that is a mix of donative-
mutual and donative-entrepreneurial. In fact, the analytical analyses in this chapter suggest that 
factors incentivizing the controlling agents as well as the uncertainty embedded in the PCROs 
investment process may explain the mix status of PCROs.  
Figure 3.8 summarizes the results of theoretical model in this chapter and helps us to present two 
hypotheses that are as follows:  
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H1: PCROs that use shared decision-making may not have frictionless measures of either 
managerial input or PCRO’s output. 
 
H2: PCROs that use shared decision-making may either have highly altruistic directors 
perceiving the managers to be more knowledgeable than the board members or their directors 
are not altruistic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8. The theoretical models’ implication for task assignment 
 
3.6. Concluding remarks 
Agency theory predicts the board of directors’ involvement in the decision-making 
process of NP organizations is primarily limited to the oversight of managers’ activities. 
However, in the course of conducting interviews with 14 PCROs it was observed the boards of 
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directors are not only in charge of monitoring of decisions made by managers, they are also 
involved in many stages of decision-making.  
To examine the factors affecting the presence of board of directors in management 
decisions an analytical model was developed in which two agents can govern a PCRO whose 
objective is to maximize the return on investment in research and market promotion projects. 
The agents are the manager and the board of directors, where only the former is paid by the 
PCRO. Both agents combine their knowledge and efforts for making an investment decision. 
The PCRO faces two choices; 1) the weight that it has to assign to each agent in the decision-
making process and 2) the payment scheme for the manager. Both of these decisions are made to 
maximize the returns on investments.  
To consider the impact of different payment schemes on the choice of the task delegation, 
two cases were taken into account. In the cases of an output-based bonus, the results of the 
model suggested the PCRO decides to assign the task to either the almost perfectly incentivized 
manager or the board of directors, depending on their relative productivity. A separation of 
decision-making and oversight would exist in these cases over a range of plausible parameter 
values. In other words, the PCROs in this case will be either mutual or entrepreneurial 
organizations.   
However, if the manager’s input is the basis for his compensation, the PCRO has to use an 
evaluation method whose accuracy depends on the presence of a third party in the process of 
decision-making. In the model it is assumed the board of directors plays the role of the third 
party, where the weight of the board of directors’ input in the decision-making process is 
positively associated with the accuracy of the manager’s measure of input. In this situation, it is 
shown that the shared decision is more likely to be the norm if the board is not drastically 
altruistic. In addition, if the board is highly altruistic, the PCRO decides to share the decision-
making if the manager has superior input quality (including knowledge or cost of exerting 
efforts) in comparison with the board.  In these situations, the board of directors will generally 
also participate in order to incentivize managerial effort on one hand and help the PCRO to 
reach its objective on the other hand. In Hansmann’s terminolgy, the results of the model 
implied that the the PCROs could become a mix of mutual and entrepreneurial NP organizations 
based upon the factors incentivizing the controlling agents as well as the uncertainty embedded 
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in the PCROs investment process. Two hypotheses were developed based on the model’s 
implications that will be more examined  in chapter four of this disseration.  
The results of the model are naturally limited by the assumptions imposed on the model. 
The model assumed the boards of directors do not impose any costs on the organization. It also 
assumed the directors do not extract any rent from the organization. Furthermore, it assumed 
that the presence of manager and board of directors in the decision-making process are 
independent of each other7. Further work could relax the above assumptions to explore the 
PCROs' choice of delegation between board of directors and manager in different situations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
7 A possible, setup could be the use of Cobb-Douglass decision-making function. The results of the model for 
output-based compensation based on a Cobb-Douglass decision-making function is presented in Appendix B.  
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Chapter 4: Survey of directors of Saskatchewan Grain PCROs 
4.1 Introduction 
Every year, producer controlled research organizations (PCROs) in Australia, Canada, the 
United States and many other countries collect hundreds of millions of dollars from farmers to 
invest in R&D and market promotion projects. The investments made by these PCROs have had 
significant impacts on agriculture innovation and the stakeholders’ well-being (Alston, Gray, & 
Bolek, 2012; Gray & Scott, 2003; GRDC, 2017). However, there is little information available 
about who makes the decisions in these entities and how. Motivated by the lack of the structured 
studies concerning the governance structure and decision-making process of PCROs, fourteen 
PCROs located in Australia, the U.S. and Canada were studied. In this process a series of 
interviews were conducted with managers and directors of these producer-led entities to gather 
information about their decision-making processes.  
The analysis of interviews presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation indicate that, except 
for GRDC in Australia, the board of directors of the PCROs studied are involved in both 
management and oversight tasks. The lack of separation in oversight and management 
assignments observed in the interviews is not consistent with most of the theoretical studies and 
empirical evidence evaluating the functions of the board of directors (Brown & Guo, 2010; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Miller-Millesen, 2003). 
 Among the literature describing the roles of the board of directors in the organizations, 
agency theory suggests an entity is supposed to assign management and oversight tasks to 
different agents. In the context of the agency theory and with the focus on the task delegation 
literature (Bester and Krähmer 2008; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Itoh 1994; Riordan and 
Sappington 1987) a theoretical model was developed in Chapter 3 of the dissertation explaining 
why a PCRO might assign the decision-making mission to the board of directors or manager.  
The results of the theoretical model presented in the third chapter of this dissertation 
suggest that the choice to share the decision-making between the manager and board depends 
upon the compensation package offered to a manager. One of the main factors motivating the 
PCROs to share the decision-making task is compensating the manager based on a measure of 
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his input. Otherwise, if the outcome of the PCROs investments are used for rewarding the 
manager, depending upon the relative productivity of the board and the manager, the PCRO will 
be better off by assigning the task to just one of the agents.  
The use of input-based compensation schemes originates from the presence of significant 
frictions in evaluating the outcomes of investments (Sappington, 1991). In the case of 
agricultural R&D projects, studies show the project results are usually realized several years after 
investments are made (Alston et al., 2011). Therefore, one can expect early measurement of 
outcomes of these investments to be difficult and measured with sizable variances. 
Consequently, a PCRO faces difficulties incentivizing its manager for exerting effort in the 
decision-making process. In light of these difficulties other tools for incentivizing the managers, 
such as input-based compensation schemes, could be used to motivate a manager  
Accurate evaluation of the manager’s input is only possible if there is a third party that in 
some way observes the manager's effort and expertise. In the theoretical model, the board of 
director’s presence in the decision-making process improves the accuracy of the manager’s input 
evaluation, by reducing the size of the variance of the measure. Moreover, the board members’ 
characteristics such as knowledge levels or altruism might affect the choice of task delegation 
made by a PCRO.  
 Motivated by the implications of the theoretical model and the shared decision-making 
observed in the PCROs two hypotheses were developed in the chapter 3 of the dissertation. First, 
observing shared decision-making suggests that PCROs may not have frictionless measures of 
either managerial input or PCRO’s output. Second, the presence of shared decision-making 
implies that may either have highly altruistic directors perceiving the managers to be more 
knowledgeable than the board members or their directors are not altruistic.  
To examine these hypotheses, a follow-up survey was conducted whose participants are the 
directors of all (eight) grain PCROs within the Canadian province of Saskatchewan. The survey 
focuses on the PCROs of Saskatchewan, because I had faster and less costly access to their 
directors. In addition, I was well aware of these organizations’ functions, which provided more 
accurate analysis of the board members’ roles.  
The survey included questions about the experiences of the participants both as farmers 
and directors. In total, 42 percent (22 out of 52) of the board members from these grain PCROs 
took part in the survey.  To be able to analyze the differences between the directors and the 
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farmers electing the board members, the data available in a farm innovation survey conducted by  
Micheels and Nolan (2016) is used as well.   
The result of the survey analyses suggest that, given observed shared decision-making; 
there are consistencies between hypotheses obtained from the theoretical model and task 
assignment of PCROs in Saskatchewan. In the case of first hypothesis, the directors’ responses 
indicated the PCROs performances are difficult to measure and the returns on investments are 
not considered as the basis for managers’ compensations. In addition, the respondents showed 
directors follow different methods to evaluate the managers’ inputs. The differences in 
evaluation approaches imply the input performance measures are not frictionless.   
Examining the second hypothesis, it was observed the directors are highly altruistic, while 
the management teams are more knowledgeable than the board of directors.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the results of the 
theoretical model and discusses the corresponding hypotheses. In Section 3 the outline and the 
characteristics of the survey are explained.  The farming characteristics of the directors are 
presented in the Section 4. Section 5 provides discussions around the hypotheses and analyzes 
the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses this chapter.  
4.2. Theories and hypotheses 
The theoretical model developed in the previous chapter considers task assignment 
between the manager and the board of directors. The objective of the PCRO is to maximize the 
return on investment by assigning the decision-making authority to the board or manager. The 
manager and the board of directors are assumed to have different incentives for exerting efforts 
within the PCRO. The organization has to make two choices. First of all, it has to determine the 
weight assigned to agents’ inputs and then the PCRO should specify the manager’s reward.  
Since agricultural research projects’ results are usually realized several years after the 
investments are made (Alston et al., 2011), a measure of outcome may not be an effective tool to 
motivate the manager. However, when output can be measured, the results of the model suggest 
that PCROs prefer to assign the decision-making job to either the manager or the board of 
directors, but not both.  In this case the delegation of the assignment depends upon the relative 
quality of the decision-making of the manager.  
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When the manager’s compensation is based upon quality of input (i.e. efforts enhanced by 
knowledge), the PCRO uses an assessment mechanism contingent on the presence of a third 
party observing the manager’s input. In the model this role is played by the board where its input 
weight in the decision-making process is directly associated with a proportional reduction in the 
friction of the manager’s input performance measure. The results of the model, in this case, 
implied shared decision-making is likely to be the norm if the board is not very altruistic. 
However, if the board is overwhelmingly altruistic, the PCRO chooses to share the task if the 
quality of manager’s input is meaningfully greater than the board. Furthermore, if there is no 
inherent friction in measuring the manager’s performance regarding his input, the PCRO will 
decide to delegate the decision-making task to either the manager or the board.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The theoretical models’ implication for task assignment 
 
Given the results of theoretical model, hypotheses no. 1 and 2 are as follows: PCROs that 
use shared decision-making may not have frictionless measures of either managerial input or 
PCRO’s output. PCROs that use shared decision-making may either have highly altruistic 
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directors perceiving the managers to be more knowledgeable than the board members or their 
directors are not altruistic. 
Examining the hypotheses, the directors of Saskatchewan grain PCROs are surveyed, 
considering the fact that we observed shared decision-making in the interviews. In the case of the 
first hypothesis, I asked two types of questions. I tried to find out how managers’ performance is 
evaluated and then the directors answered questions regarding the methods by which the 
managers are compensated.  
To examine the second hypothesis, the respondents’ answers regarding the factors 
motivating them to exert efforts in the PCROs, as well as their perceptions about the 
management team’s relative knowledge levels are taken into consideration. Examining the 
responses of survey participants, it will be discussed later in this chapter whether the first and the 
second hypothesis are consistent with governance mechanism of PCROs or not. 
4.3 Survey Characteristics 
The focus of the study is on Saskatchewan’s grain PCROs that invest producer levies in 
research and market promotion projects related to different types of crops. These crops include 
pulses, wheat, barley, canola, flax, winter cereals, canary seed, and mustard. The Saskatchewan 
PCROs were chosen for the survey primarily due to the ease of accessibility. All of these 
organizations are located in Saskatoon and their meetings are held in this city. For instance, I 
could convince several directors to participate in the survey during the PCROs annual general 
meeting. In addition, focusing on one region could provide more consistent examination of the 
hypotheses, especially as I am more familiar with most of the PCROs in the regions and their 
managers and directors.  
The survey questionnaire contained seventy-four semi-structured questions capturing 
information about the directors’ experiences both as farmers and the PCROs’ board members. 
The questions concerning the farming experience of the board members are borrowed from a 
recent farm innovation survey (Micheels and Nolan, 2016). Using farm innovation survey 
provides the opportunity to compare the characteristics of the larger population of farmers of 
Saskatchewan and the smaller subgroup of elected directors who are also farmers in this 
province.  
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4.3.1. The process of data collection 
There are fifty-two directors serving as board members in eight grain PCROs within 
Saskatchewan. I began by sending forty emails to the directors, including the survey’s cover 
letter and confidentiality agreement. I also attended the annual general meeting of some of these 
organizations and asked the directors whether they would take part in the survey. Several 
attempts were made to contact as many directors as possible via phone. In the end 22 board 
members were interviewed (42 percent participation rate). In twenty cases the interviews 
conducted via phone and two directors wanted to fill the survey by themselves. To encourage 
participation, an iPad Pro was awarded to one of the directors who participated in the survey, 
selected by random draw.  
It took more than three weeks (January 6, 2017 to January 31, 2017) to conduct the 
interviews. The interviews ranged from 40 to 70 minutes long. After conducting seven 
interviews, it was decided to add a few questions and change the structure of some other 
questions. In the case of open questions, I took note of the directors’ responses and before 
proceeding to the next question made sure their ideas were reflected accurately.   
4.4 Comparing Farmers of Saskatchewan and directors of its PCROs 
Using the data from farm innovation survey, this section compares farmers of 
Saskatchewan and directors of grain PCROs and their farming experiences. The farm innovation 
survey was conducted in 2013, among the farmers of three Canadian provinces: Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba. However, a subsample of farm innovation survey participants is 
considered in here. The subsample used in the analyses includes farmers of Saskatchewan whose 
farm sizes are more than 600 acres and their farming activities include grain production. The rest 
of the farmers are excluded because there are farmers in the farm innovation survey whose farm 
sizes were small (e.g. less than 100 acres). In the sample of directors, the smallest farm size was 
760 acres. Excluding small farm sizes in the sample allowed us to get more consistent 
comparisons. The farmers whose farming activities is limited to beef or dairy production are 
excluded as well, because the focus the study is on the directors of grain PCROs whose directors 
are supposed to produce the commodities the groups represent.  
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As indicated in Table 4.1, on average a director’s farm size in the sample is 4117.86 acres, 
including owned and rented lands. However, the average farm size of farmers who work on more 
than 600 acres of land in Saskatchewan is 2401.92.  
Testing the normality distribution for total land with the Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro & 
Wilk, 1965), the analyses indicates the normal distribution null hypothesis is rejected for both 
groups. Therefore, a non-parametric test was employed to compare two groups and see whether 
the distribution of their farm size is different or not.  
Conducting the Mann-Whitney test it was observed that the mean rank for the non-director 
farmers in the case of the total land variable is 51.30 and for the board members is 77.77. 
Consequently, the Mann-Whitney U statistic is 522, Wilcoxon W statistic is 46.17, and the Z 
statistic is equal to -3.429 resulting in the 2-tailed asymptotic significance of 0.001 that rejects 
the null hypothesis. This suggests, in the case of farm size, directors are different than the rest of 
farmers in Saskatchewan.  
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Table 4.1. Directors’ Farming Operation in comparison with Saskatchewan Farmers (total 
land>600 acres) 
 Directors’ Net 
Total Land 
(Acres) 
Saskatchewan 
Farmers’ 
Net Total Land 
(Acres) 
Directors’ years 
At farm 
Saskatchewan 
Farmers’ 
Years at farm 
     
Mean 4117.86 2401.92 32.91 26.66 
Number 22 90 22 90 
Standard 
Deviation 
3280.63 2668.01 11.05 16.653 
Minimum 760 600 15 0 
Maximum 13200 18000 50 75 
Range 12440 17400 35 75 
Skewness 1.08 
(Std. Dev.: 
0.491) 
4.07 
(Std. Dev.: 
0.254) 
0.103 
(Std. Dev.: 
0.491) 
0.196 
(Std. Dev.: 0.254) 
Kurtosis 0.890 
(Std. Dev.: 
0.953) 
20.492 
(Std. Dev.: 
0.439) 
-1.482 
(Std. Dev.: 
0.953) 
-0.439 
(Std. Dev.: 0.503) 
 
In addition, on average a director has managed his/her farm for 32.91 years while on 
average this figure for farmers of Saskatchewan with farm sizes of more than 600 acres is 26.66 
years. About 64 percent of the board members stated that, in 2015 or 2016, they allocated more 
than 40 hours per week to their agricultural operation. This number is about 53 percent for the 
rest of farmers in Saskatchewan.   
Approximately half of the directors in the sample achieved a bachelor degree or above and 
more than 27 percent of them have completed a technical or college diploma. However, the 
percentage of the directors with higher education is considerably greater than the total population 
of farmers in Saskatchewan. As indicated in figure 4.2, around 29 percent of the farmers have 
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bachelor or higher university degrees and only 24 percent of them have completed college or 
technical diploma. These numbers for the directors are 50 and 27 percent respectively.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. What is the highest level of education you have achieved? 
 Figure 4.3 illustrates the cumulative frequency graph of the directors and farmers’ 
education levels.  In general, one could see that directors are more educated than the rest of the 
farmers. For instance, more than 86 percent of the directors have at minimum a technical or 
college diploma while in the case of farmers this figure is 66.7 percent.   
Therefore, as the directors on average are more educated and experienced than most other 
farmers, it could be said the directors are more likely to be prone to learning. In addition, 
considering these two characteristics of the directors, one could expect that the directors are 
expected to make more informed decisions in comparison with an average farmer.       
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Figure 4.3. Percentage cumulative frequency graph of farmers and directors’ 
education levels 
 
4.4.2. Three most important farming goals amongst the directors and farmers 
In the survey the directors were asked about the three most important goals in their farming 
businesses. The same question is also part of the farm innovation survey. The farmers and 
directors provided number of different answers. These answers were classified in three main 
categories: profitability, sustainability and growth.  
The categories are considered based on the direct answers or the purpose of the goals 
provided. For instance, in the case of profitability, farmers and directors stated that their goals 
are running a profitable business (direct answer), to save for retirement, make a living, weed 
management, soil heath and growing a good crop rotation. In these cases, it is suggested that 
these responses are related to the goal of running a profitable business. Moreover, the 
respondents provided similar answers in the case of different goals. This means there are 
responses in which the survey’s participants told us their first most important goal is to make a 
living and in the same time their second most important goal is to grow good crop rotation, 
therefore based on the categorization, profitability shows up in more than one goal.   
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The responses related to sustainability and inter-generational succession is categorized into 
one category. In this case there are answers expressed more than once by some of the directors or 
farmers.  
The third category denotes growth or expansion of the farm business. There were also few 
answers like “farming for fun” or “I like doing it” that were not included in any category. 
Comparing the answers provided by the respondents of both surveys, one could observe 
profitability is the primary goal of most farmers and directors in their business. As well it seems 
this goal is more important for farmers in comparison with directors. The frequency of responses 
suggests that sustainability has higher value for the directors in contrast with farmers. Also, it 
seems that growth and expansion is very important for the board members in the sample, as the 
third most important goal in their farming business.  
The higher frequency of responses referring to the sustainability and expansion amongst 
the directors, proportional to the farmers, could imply the board members in the sample have 
longer horizons in their farming business. Therefore, they are more likely to consider making 
investment decisions in the PCROs whose returns are realized in the long run.  
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Figure 4.4 what are your three most important goals in your farm business. 
4.5. Results: 
Given the shared decision-making observed in Saskatchewan grain PCROs, two 
hypotheses are examined in this section. For each hypothesis, the responses corresponding to the 
components of hypotheses are taken into consideration and subsequently I will discuss the 
consistency of hypotheses with survey results.  
4.5.1 Hypothesis 1: 
PCROs that use shared decision-making may not have frictionless measures of either 
managerial input or PCRO’s output. 
Informed by the interviews presented in the second chapter of the dissertation, it would 
seem that the PCROs in Saskatchewan follow a shared decision-making process. The results of 
the survey also imply that the roles of board members of PCROs in the sample are not limited to 
oversight tasks — they are involved in managerial decision-making as well. Therefore, based on 
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the theoretical model results, it is expected that the managers of Saskatchewan PCROs are not 
compensated based on the outcome of the investments. On the other hand, if the managers’ 
rewards are associated with their inputs in the PCROs, the measure of managers’ contributions 
are evaluated by some frictions. 
The involvement of directors in the PCROs 
The directors and managers of PCROs who participated in the interviews stated that the 
directors are highly involved in the process of decision-making. In the survey of directors of 
Saskatchewan PCROs an attempt was made to gather more accurate information about the types 
and amount of efforts spent by the board members. The survey results indicate that more than 68 
percent of the directors who participated in the survey have been the member of the research 
committee. As it is indicated in chapter two of this dissertation, the research committee has 
considerable influence in most of PCROs, regarding the final decisions made about research 
investments. This committee encompasses directors and staff and ranks the proposals sent to the 
PCROs. The board members also play important roles in determining the priorities and strategies 
of their corresponding PCROs. 
In terms of quantity of efforts spent by the directors, the board members’ responses show 
that, on average, half of the directors in the sample spend more than 25 hours a month for the 
organization activities inside the PCRO. Even director no. 2 stated that: 
“This is not a fair question because from October 2015 till March 2016 I 
spent between 40 to 48 hours per month on organization activities”. 
As indicated in figure 4.5, one can see that more than 70 percent of the directors allocated 
more than 15 hours per month on the organizations activities in the previous year8. 
                                                
 
8 It was observed that the respondents that are the member of board of directors of smaller organizations, 
such as winter cereals, mustard and canary seed, are likely to spend less time on the organization’s 
activities. These PCROs do not hire a full-time manager as well, because their levy revenue is 
proportionally lower than other organizations such as wheat, pulse and canola commissions.  
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Figure 4.5. On average how many hours do you spend on organizations activities per 
month? 
 
In addition, it seems that most of the directors are heavily involved with the PCROs 
activities, even outside of the organization’s formal activities. Around 90 percent of board 
members said they think about the organization’s affairs outside of the board meetings, at least 
once or several times per day.  
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Figure 4.6. How often do you think about the organization affairs outside  
of the board meeting? 
PCROs performance measure 
The analyses of the responses show the directors do not have similar perceptions about the 
measure of the PCROs’ performances. These differences seem to be related to the nature of 
agriculture R&D projects whose returns are realized after several years (Alston et al., 2011). In 
this case, some of the board members mentioned the difficulty in measuring the performances of 
the PCROs in terms of the specific numbers.  
Examining the answers provided by board members suggest PCROs mostly rely on highly 
subjective measures. Out of eighteen responses received, ten directors (about 56 percent) 
mentioned they use strategic plans as basis for the organization’s performance evaluation. Also 
the respondents indicated they use other measures to evaluate the performance of the PCROs 
investments. These measures include financial status, achievements of yearly objectives, survey 
of producers and levy refund ratios.  
However, directors use both subjective and objective measures if they have to provide 
information about the PCRO’s achievements to stakeholders. I asked the board members who 
participated in the survey “how do you respond to producers when they ask about value of 
investments made by the PCROs?”  
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Figure 4.7. How do you respond to producers when they ask about value of investments 
made by the PCRO? 
 
Although, several respondents told that they have not been asked such questions, based on 
the answers one can distinguish between three different types of information that a director might 
provide about the value of investments made within the PCROs.  
More than 76 percent of respondent stated that they provide information about the rate of 
returns of the previous or current investments, to indicate investments in agriculture R&D result 
in notable return. However, PCROs in Saskatchewan infrequently rely on ex-ante cost/benefit 
analyses and the responses are primarily about the ex-post cost/benefit investigations.  
In addition, more than 57 percent of the directors stated that they provide information 
about the type of investments made as well.  
Around 24 percent of directors suggested that they would offer information about the 
organization activities such as the research organizations and researchers that work with the 
PCROs.  
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Therefore, it would seem there is more than one measure of performance used by the 
directors to evaluate Saskatchewan’s PCROs. However, the examination of the responses implies 
there are no consistent perceptions of the measures amongst board members.  
It also appears that the PCROs’ performances are not easy to evaluate from the point of 
views of the directors. As illustrated in Figure 4.8, only around 55 percent of the directors in the 
sample clearly agreed that the outcomes of the organization investments could be measured with 
accuracy.  
  
 
Figure 4.8.  The outcomes of the organization investments can be measured with accuracy. 
How are the management teams rewarded in Saskatchewan PCROs? 
So far the analyses imply that there are discrepancies and significant variances in the 
performance evaluations of Saskatchewan PCROs. Therefore, as the theoretical model implies9, 
rewarding the managers based on the measure of output will not provide appropriate incentives 
for them. In this case, I asked directors who are in charge of management team evaluation 
whether they agree or disagree that the manager and staff compensation should be based on their 
contributions toward the returns on investment rather than their efforts and expertise. More than 
                                                
 
9 The theoretical model suggests that in the case of output-based compensation scheme, manager’ reward is 
negatively associated with the variance of the performance measure (E∗ = 1/(1 + @>A)) 
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95 percent of the directors did not agree that management teams’ compensations should be based 
on their contributions towards the returns on investment.  
 
Figure 4.9. Should manager and staff compensation be based on their contributions   
toward the return on investments made, rather than their efforts and expertise? 
As it indicated, a majority of the board members disagree with the use of output-based 
compensation plans. Therefore, efforts were made to gather additional information concerning 
the methods by which the directors evaluate the managers’ performances.    
First I asked respondents whether they are aware of manager and staff efforts for the 
PCROs. Around 73 percent of the respondents answered that they have very good knowledge of 
the manager and staff’s efforts spent in the organizations. Then I asked the respondent to explain 
how they know the managers are good at their jobs. Examining the answers, I observed in the 
case of measuring inputs, the directors do not follow the same measures to evaluate manager 
inputs. More than 36 percent of the directors in the sample expressed that they can directly 
observe the manager’s efforts and expertise. For instance, director no. 4 stated that: 
“…The manager and staff’s efforts are evident at each board meeting, 
each research committee meeting and the annual and semiannual meeting…”  
Or director no. 13 indicated that:  
“…By being with the manager we know what they are doing” 
In addition, director no. 14 told us:  
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“I judge him with what he has done, I look at annual reviews, his plans 
and we look at the milestone and what he has done. I also get exposed to the 
manager by being involved. I also compare him with other people and we get 
the best manager in western Canada. He is very knowledgeable.” 
 
The second most mentioned measure was the information provided by the manager to 
facilitate the board’s decision-making. In fact, more than 27 percent of the respondents in some 
way stated they consider how well a manager facilitates board decision-making by providing 
information for the directors. For example, director no. 1 said:  
“I know if he is good at his job based on the knowledge that he brings to 
us for making investment decisions and he brings a lot”  
Or director no 15 expressed that:  
“Our CEO has a lots of contacts that really helps us to make informed 
decisions because of his background. He also helps us to make informed 
decision by bringing proposals forward…” 
 
There are also other measures used by the board members to evaluate the manager’s 
performance, such as interaction with the board, pursuing and implementing the strategies set by 
the board, interaction with other PCROs, comparing with other PCROs’ managers and finally 
relying on the process in which the manager is hired.   
To sum up, examining the directors’ responses, it was observed the PCROs’ performances 
are evaluated mostly based on subjective measures and with considerable frictions. However, the 
survey’s results imply that the PCROs do not tend to reward the management teams according to 
their contribution towards the return on investments.   
Furthermore, the survey participants indicated they are well aware of the manager and 
staff’s efforts and expertise. The directors primarily evaluate the managers’ performances 
regarding their contribution towards making the decisions and not the outcomes of the decisions. 
However, the directors who are in charge of the managers’ performance evaluations assess the 
influence of the manager roles for making the decisions in different ways.    
As a consequence, it is suggested there are some consistencies between the real work task 
assignment practice in Saskatchewan PCROs and hypothesis no. 1 stating that “If shared 
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decision making is observed, the manager’s compensation package is based on neither the 
outcomes of PCRO’s investments or a frictionless measurement of managerial input.”  
4.5.2. Hypothesis No 2:  
 PCROs that use shared decision-making may either have highly altruistic directors 
perceiving the managers to be more knowledgeable than the board members or their directors 
are not altruistic. Examining hypothesis no. 2, two types of information in this section will be 
provided, the factors motivating the directors for exerting efforts and relative knowledge of the 
management team to the board.  
What factors motivate the directors? 
First, I asked the directors to explain what motivated them to stand for election. Analyzing 
the survey participants’ responses, the factors incentivizing the board members can be classified 
in three categories: altruism, personal gains and a combination of these two reasons.  
 More than 59 percent of the directors stated they nominated themselves in the election just 
for altruistic reasons. Half of the directors nominated themselves for altruistic purposes indicated 
that they were interested in serving other farmers. For instance, directors no. 18 said:  
 “I wanted to be at the service of industry. In fact, by being at the board 
you feel you have meaningful input for the industry” 
 
Or director no. 4 who expressed:  
“I seek to improve the profitability of farming specially for all farmers in 
Canada” 
 Some directors in this category are interested in becoming the voice of other farmers:  
Director no. 3 said: 
“I nominated myself because I wanted to represent the southern 
Saskatchewan farmers at the organization” 
Board member number 19 stated:  
“…I wanted to be in the organization because it could remedy the loss of 
wheat board. I also wanted to be the voice of the farmers.” 
Or director no. 20 told us:  
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“Because the government does not treat farmers fairly so I wanted to be 
the voice of farmers so they could have say and power” 
 Some board members who ran for the election just for altruistic purposes stated they 
wanted to pass on their experiences to others. Director no. 21 indicated that: 
“I have experiences to offer. I also wanted to work with younger 
members to pay forward and pass the experiences for agriculture industry” 
Also director no. 14 said: 
 “I ran for the election because I wanted to offer leadership to the 
farmers” 
Two of the directors became board members because of requests they received from other 
directors. However, as they could simply reject the offers but did not, they can be classified as 
those who ran for the election because they care about others. For example, respondent no 9. 
Indicated that:  
“I provided some agronomic services for another board member of the 
organization and he offered me to run because of my knowledge and I did” 
On the other hand, there are some directors (18 percent) who nominated themselves just for 
the sake of personal gains. However, these gains are mostly in the form of non-monetary benefits 
such as learning or networking opportunities. For instance, director no.1 expressed that: 
“I was interested to run for the election because I wanted to see what is 
going on in the industry as I am involved in the export of the crop” 
Director no. 10 stated that:  
“It was an opportunity for me to see the changes that happens in the 
industry and have my voice heard”  
In addition, some other board members (23 percent) took part in the election for both 
personal gain and altruistic purposes. In this case, the personal gains that the directors are 
looking for are mostly in the form of learning and networking opportunities. Their altruistic 
agendas are in the form of serving others, passing on the experiences and representing other 
farmers. Below some of the directors’ responses classified in the third category are quoted: 
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“I ran to stay active at farm advocacy and mostly because of my interest 
in research” 
          Director no. 17  
“I wanted to expand my knowledge base… also it is an opportunity for 
networking with other people… I also wanted to be involved in the industry” 
          Director no. 15 
“I was unhappy with governance direction of the organization…besides I 
have strong interest of being involved with agricultural affairs and I am 
looking to expand my horizon” 
          Director no. 5 
 Investigating the motivations of the board members in the sample, one could suggest 
altruism is the most important reason motivating the directors of Saskatchewan PCROs. In fact, 
around 82 percent of the respondents sampled somehow mentioned they wanted to be a member 
of board of directors because of their interest in serving the industry. The second most important 
cause incentivizing the directors is learning and networking opportunities. The results of the 
survey show 32 percent of the respondents wanted to learn more about the industry or they 
wanted to expand their knowledge or connections.  
The directors were also asked to provide their opinion about the fairness of board 
members’ payments in the PCROs. More than 64 percent of the respondents believe the directors 
are paid fairly, proportional to their efforts.  However, there is not a strong correlation between 
the reason behind running for election and the satisfaction of respondents with their payments. 
This is because some of the directors’ agreements or disagreements with the fairness of the board 
members’ compensation were not related to their attitude toward altruism. For instance, director 
no. 4 who said I somewhat disagree with the fairness of payments told us:   
“I somewhat disagree because we are all paid 300 CAD per day while 
this is not fair for our chair as he puts much more effort than us” 
          Director no. 4 
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Figure 4.10. Directors are paid fairly proportional do their effort. 
  
 Directors no. 11 and 20 both mentioned board members have notable marginal costs for 
participating in the PCROs. However, the former director disagrees that the board members are 
paid fairly and the latter one agreed. In fact, respondent no. 20 who believes the directors are 
paid fairly stated that:  
“There is no way that we can be paid fairly proportional to our effort as 
we could gain more at our farm, so I agree”   
 Given the presence of shared decision-making and dominance of altruism as a factor 
motiving the directors, according to the hypothesis no. 2, one can expect that the management 
team should be more knowledgeable than the board members. In this case, I asked the 
respondents to rate the relative knowledge of the managers and staff to the board members. More 
than 72 percent of the board members stated they think that manager and staff are more or much 
more knowledgeable than the directors.  
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Figure 4.11. How do you rate the relative knowledge of the manager and staff to that 
of the board? 
To sum up, given the presence of shared decision-making observed, one can note the 
directors are highly altruistic and at the same time the management teams are more 
knowledgeable than the board of directors. Therefore, it is suggested there are consistencies 
between governance mechanism of Saskatchewan PCROs and hypothesis number 2.  
4.6. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter serves two purposes. It examines two hypotheses initiated from the theoretical 
model of chapter three and it reflects on some of the characteristics of the directors of PCROs in 
Saskatchewan and compare them with the larger population of farmers within the province.  
In the first part of this chapter some of the characteristics of the board member with the 
farmers of Saskatchewan were compared. The results of the investigations indicated the directors 
on average have larger farm size; longer horizons, more farming experience and finally they are 
more educated than the rest of the farmers.  
The second section briefly reviewed the results of this dissertation theoretical model and 
discussed the implications of the results and then presented two hypotheses stemming from the 
theoretical chapter. Following the results of the theoretical model presented in the previous 
chapter, two hypotheses were evaluated in this chapter. First hypothesis suggests that if the 
decision-making authority is shared between the board and manager, the manager’s 
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compensation package is based on the measure of manager’s input or this measure is 
accompanied with frictions. The second hypothesis implies that if a PCRO shares decision-
making, the directors are not altruistic, or the directors are highly altruistic and the manager’s 
relative knowledge level is greater than the board. 
To examine these hypotheses, a follow-up survey was conducted whose participants are the 
directors of all (eight) grain PCROs of the province of Saskatchewan in Canada. The 
examination of the survey results suggested that, given observed shared decision-making, there 
are consistencies between the real worlds takes assignment practice of PCROs and the 
hypotheses extracted from the theoretical model. In the case of the first hypothesis, the directors’ 
responses indicated the PCROs performances are challenging to measure and the returns on 
investments are not considered as the basis for manager compensation. In addition, the 
respondents showed they use different approaches to evaluate the managers’ efforts and 
expertise. The discrepancies in measures indicated the input performance measures are not 
frictionless.   
Examining, the second hypothesis, it was observed that the directors are highly altruistic 
and in the same time the management teams are more knowledgeable than the board of directors.  
Therefore, it is suggested that the theoretical model presented in the third chapter can explain the 
behavior of PCROs in their task assignment practices.  
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions 
5.1 Introduction  
The goal of this dissertation was to explore decision-making process and governance 
structure of PCROs, with the objective of creating public knowledge that can improve the 
PCROs governance. The organizations investigated in this dissertation are different than 
agricultural cooperatives and agricultural producers associations in which farmers are present at 
directors. PCROs are different than cooperatives because as we explain later PCROs have the 
non-distribution constraint and considered as NP organizations. The PCROs do not have any 
residual claimants, as the shares are not defined in these entities.  However, cooperatives 
distribute their profits amongst their members (Hansmann 1980). The PCROs should be also 
distinguished from the agricultural producer associations that are NP organizations by nature. 
This is because the PCOs are typically granted taxing power by governments while agricultural 
producer associations, as NP organizations, do not have such a power. Furthermore, the PCROs 
are specially tasked with investing farmers’ checkoff in agricultural  R&D and promotion 
projects, while the tasks of agricultural cooperatives and agricultural producer associations 
include a wide range of activities including marketing, advocacy, distribution and so on.  
To meet the objective of the study, case study methodologies were used similar to those 
employed by Eisenhardt (1989), Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) and Siggelkow (2007). The 
study revealed the differences and similarities amongst these entities governance and decision-
making process. Consequently, given the existing theories and literature, the study tried to 
provide theoretical explanations of PCROs’ governance structure. Finally, this doctoral 
dissertation checked for consistency between the theoretical results and the governance of 
PCROs, by exploring whether two hypotheses derived from the theoretical model were 
consistent with observation.  
Interviews were conducted with managers and directors of several key PCROs across 
Canada, Australia and the U.S. to examine the decision-making process of these producer-led 
organizations. Among several interesting results, interviews revealed that with the exception 
GRDC in Australia, the rest of PCROs involved their board members in the management 
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decisions. This observation is in contrast with the general task assignment practices of NP and 
FP enterprises. A model based on agency theory was developed in this doctoral dissertation to 
explain the unusual task delegation practice of PCROs. Two hypotheses were derived from the 
outcomes of the theoretical model. The fourth chapter of the dissertation reports the results of the 
hypotheses examinations with the use of data collected in a survey of all the grain PCROs in the 
Canadian province of Saskatchewan.     
The results of the research conducted in this dissertation have several contributions: 1) it 
fills a gap in the literature related to the governance of PCROs by providing an extensive 
examination of these organizations decision-making process and governance structures. 2) It 
provides a theoretical explanation regarding the nature of PCROs’ functions in the context of NP 
organizations literature, 3) the study reveals an apparent anomaly in the governance of PCROs 
by showing that the oversight and management tasks are not separated in these producer-led 
entities, 4) it provides the best management practices that can be used by PCROs to improve 
their governance and decision-making, 5) it provides a theoretical explanation regarding the lack 
of separation between oversight and management in the PCROs and expands the theory 
developed by Hansmann (1980) regarding the presence of patrons in controlling of NP 
organizations, 6) it contributes to the task delegation literature by incorporating the impact of 
long investment horizons, the output versus inputs performance measures and collective 
incentives into the task assignment model, 7) the study provides basis for further investigations 
of the NP and FP organizations in which the return on investments are accompanied with great 
deal of delay and uncertainty, 8) finally the study provides empirical support for the implications 
of the theory developed by emphasizing on the importance of the performance measures based 
on the input of the managers, altruism of directors and relative knowledge of agents involved in 
decision-making of PCROs.  
5.2. The conclusion of study 
A synopsis of the three studies conducted to meet the objectives of this doctoral 
dissertation is presented below.  
5.2.1. Research allocation decision-making in PCROs  
A series of interviews with managers and directors of some of key PCROs in Canada, 
Australia and the U.S. were conducted to gather information about the governance and decision-
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making in PCROs. The analyses of interviews, presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, 
revealed important information about some features of PCROs: 1) PCROs are NP organizations 
with non-distribution constraint, 2) farmers and professional managers are both involved in 
making investment decision of PCROs implying that these organizations are primarily a mix of 
donative-mutual and donative-entrepreneurial based on Hansmann (1980)’s classification of NP 
enterprises, 3) one can distinguish between five stages of decision-making in the research 
decision-making of of PCROs: i) determination of priorities, ii) request for proposals (RFP), iii) 
review and ranking of proposals, iv) measuring performance and v) finally collecting grower 
feedback and information about their research interests, 4) scoring is the primary method of 
project ranking in most PCROs while cost-benefit analysis or internal rate of return is seldom 
used. 5) the directors of PCROs sampled are highly involved in the management decision 
implying that these producer-led entities do not tend to separate oversight and management.  
5.2.2. Task assignment in producer controlled research organization, a theoretical 
explanation  
The study presented in Chapter 2 revealed that PCROs do not separate oversight and 
management. Thus, a theoretical model based on the agency theory was developed to explain this 
unusual task assignment. The model presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation considers a 
PCRO that must delegate the share of decision-making power to the manager and the board of 
directors, with the objective of maximizing return to producers. Motivated by interviews and 
strands of literature the model incorporates several factors into the task delegation of the PCRO. 
The factors include: characteristics of the board of directors (i.e. share of the industry, attitude 
toward altruism and learning capacity), the relative knowledge levels of the manager and board 
members, and the ability to incentivize the effort of the manager based on imperfectly-measured 
output or decision-making input. The results imply that managers tend to be imperfectly 
incentivized, because output can only be measured with long lags and uncertainty, and input 
measurement requires monitoring. Board members, on the other hand, can be less 
knowledgeable, but can be highly motivated by vested interest in outcomes, altruism and 
learning opportunities.  
In the special case of an output-based bonus, a separation of decision-making and oversight 
would exis,t and the PCRO will assign the task to either a perfectly incentivized manager or the 
board of directors. When output cannot be measured and the manager’s reward must be based on 
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his/her observed input, shared decision is more likely to be the norm. If the board is highly 
altruistic, it will be optimal for the PCRO to share the decision-making if the manager’s input 
qualities, including his knowledge level or cost of exerting efforts, are superior.  In these 
situations, the board of directors will generally also participate in order to both incentivize 
managerial effort and help the PCRO to reach its objectives.  
5.2.3.  Task assignment in the PCROs, an empirical examination  
Chapter 4 of this dissertation examined two hypotheses derived from the theoretical model 
of Chapter 3. The first hypothesis states that; PCROs that use shared decision-making may not 
have frictionless measures of either managerial input or PCRO’s output. The second hypothesis 
states that; PCROs that use shared decision-making may either have highly altruistic directors 
perceiving the managers to be more knowledgeable than the board members or their directors 
are not altruistic.  
To examine these hypotheses a survey of board member from (eight) grain PCROs within 
the Canadian province of Saskatchewan was conducted. The results of another survey, called the 
farm innovation survey (Micheels and Nolan, 2016) was used to provide a comparison between 
directors of PCROs and the farmers of Saskatchewan. In general, it was observed that directors 
on average have larger farm size; longer horizons, more farming experience and finally they are 
more educated than the rest of the farmers. 
The examination of the survey results suggested that, given observed shared decision-
making, there are consistencies between the task assignment practice of PCROs and the 
hypotheses derived from the theoretical model. In the case of first hypothesis, the directors’ 
responses indicated the PCRO performance is challenging to measure and the return on 
investments are not considered as the basis for manager compensation. In addition, the 
respondents showed they use different approaches to evaluate the managers’ efforts and 
expertise. The discrepancies and variability in the measures indicated the input performance 
measures are not frictionless.  
Examining the second hypothesis it was observed that the directors are highly altruistic and 
in the same time the management teams are perceived to be more knowledgeable than the board 
of directors. While these small samples rule out any definitive statistical tests, the consistency 
between the hypothesis derived from the theoretical model and the observation provides some 
support for the theoretical model. 
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5.3. Implications of the study 
The following section presents the implications derived from this doctoral dissertation for 
the PCROs, implications for other organizations and policy makers.  
5.3.1. Implications for PCROs 
1) The PCROs are unique entities that do not separate between management and oversight. 
The current governance structure of PCROs seems to be inevitable for two reasons: 1) the 
outcomes of investments are not observable in the short-run and 2) the directors benefit from 
their involvements in the process of decision-making. Therefore, it seems that there is a 
rationale behind the choice of shared decision-making in these organizations. Hence, it is 
suggested that the PCROs should continue to follow their current mode of decision-making. 
Amongst the PCROs sampled, GRDC is the only organization in which management and 
oversight are separated. However, this entity spends a considerable portion of its resources to 
identify the outcomes of the investments made. This organization commissions ex-post 
benefit/cost analyses, provides annual survey of growers to evaluate producers’ insights and 
reactions to investments made, it provides a survey of research partners to make sure the 
connections between research and GRDC are on the right tracks and there are extensive 
measures used to examine the proposals validity and projects advancements. Therefore, it seems 
that the separation of management and oversight is a feasible governance mode that could be 
used in large PCROs.  
 2) The results of the study show that board members’ altruism and knowledge levels are 
important contributions to the success of PCROs. This implies that resources spent on 
recruitment, training and retention will play long-term dividends for producers supporting the 
PCROs.  
3) Without exception, all the PCROs in the sample engage producers in the processes of 
decision-making. In this case, one can distinguish between two decision-making modes that are 
bottom-up and top-down process. In the top-down mode, the directors representing the 
producers determine the priorities, strategies and investments’ directions. These guidelines 
determine the investments direction of the PCROs and its future performance. In the bottom-up 
method mostly used by GRDC in Australia, the producers get involved in the process at the 
lower levels of decision-making and their interests are reflected in bottom-up mode. However, 
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in several cases the organizations started to use a combination of bottom-up and top-down 
methods. For instance, in the case of GRDC it was observed that, RCSNs and GSGs are two 
new entities encompassing farmers and other agricultural sector stakeholders, that not only 
transfer the regional problems to higher levels of decision-making, but also have authority and 
resources to invest in a set of projects related to their regions.  
This feature of the PCROs seems to be a best practice. However, the PCROs might want 
to consider decision-making where the top-down and bottom-up modes of decision-making are 
in a balance.  
4) PCROs primarily rely on subjective measures for making investment decisions and 
scoring methods are used to rank the projects. However, several studies that have examined 
these methods (Alston et al., 1995; Pannell, 2015; Pannell & Gibson, 2014) show that 
overlooking economic theories and overweighting the subjective measures in the choice of the 
projects could result in considerable loss of the resource. Thus, it is suggested that the PCROs 
could benefit by relying more on economic-based decision-making tools such as internal rate of 
return or benefit/cost analysis. 
5.3.2. Implications for other organizations 
These results of this doctoral research indicate that there are situations in which the 
separation of oversight and management decisions may not be feasible or even desirable. This is 
especially the case when the outcomes of an organization's investments are measured with great 
deal of delay or uncertainty. The theory and discussions provided in this study are consistent 
with the behavior of VCs in start-up companies documented in the literature. Several studies 
show that VCs look for higher levels of control in start-ups in which the returns on investments 
are accompanied with great deal of uncertainty. Thus, this dissertation demonstrates that there 
may be exceptions to the best practice of separating oversight and management.  
5.3.3. Policy implications 
The government, market and contract failures in agricultural research investments are three 
reasons behind the establishment of PCROs. The PCROs and NP organizations complement 
public and private sectors in agricultural research investments. The results of this study imply 
that the lack of separation between management and oversight in PCROs seems to be necessary 
for these organizations to be able to correct for the government, market and contract failures.  
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 The unusual task assignment of PCROs helps these producer-led entities to accomplish 
their mission in provision of industry good. However, there are factors that could result in the 
failure of these organizations to invest sufficiently and efficiently in agricultural research. These 
factors include: difference in producers’ innovativeness, agency problem due to difference in the 
interests of decisions makers (Alston & Fulton, 2012), institutional lock-in (Froystad, 2012), 
high rate of spillovers and negative attitudes of producers about the effectiveness of PCROs’ 
investments due to long investment horizon of these organizations (Gray, 2014). Therefore, it is 
suggested that the policy makers might cooperate with these organizations to reduce the 
negative impacts of aforementioned factors.  
5.4. Future research  
This study has addressed a gap in the literature regarding the governance structure and 
decision-making of PCROs and it can be used to provide a basis for research in future.  
This study is one of the first attempts to systematically study the decision-making and 
governance of PCROs. As such it employed a case study approach and confined the scope of 
study to 14 grain-based PCROs in three countries.  A natural extension of this research would be 
to expand the research to other countries and other agricultural commodities. If it was possible 
to create a large enough data set some of the theory developed in this dissertation could be 
explored with more formal statistical tests of inference.  
While this study primarily focuses on the internal affairs of PCROs, most of the PCROs   
collaborated with other PCROs particularly in jointly funding research. Future study could 
examine these interrelationships to gain a better understanding the role they play in decision-
making.  
The researchers funded by PCROs often closely collaborate with PCROs in the decision-
making. In particular, the use of subjective measures to rank the projects could potentially raise 
agency problem between PCROs as principals and researchers as agents.  
Future studies could also explore the organizations in other industries that are in charge of 
producing industry goods. As a start it would be useful explore to what extent to similar 
organizations exist in other industries and if they exist how do they make decisions. If they do 
not exist, is there scope to model their creation from the success in agriculture.  
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Another interesting topic that could be taken into consideration in the future is study of 
entities in private and public sectors that do not tend to separate between oversight and 
management. In particular, the insights provided in this study could be used to find out whether 
the lack of separation in other organizations is related to the implications of this study, or not.   
There exists a rich literature related to the characteristics of directors of NP and FP 
organizations and their influence on the performance of organizations. However, there is no 
such study related to the PCROs. Hence, using the insights provided by this dissertation, future 
studies could specifically focus on such a topic. 
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Appendix A: The list of organization sampled 
GFO Grain Farmers of Ontario 
GRDC Grain  Research and Development Corporations 
MCG Manitoba Canola Growers 
SCDC Saskatchewan Canola Development Commission 
SFDC Saskatchewan Flax Development Commission 
SPG Saskatchewan Pulse Growers 
SWDC Saskatchewan Wheat Development Commission 
KWC Kansas Wheat Commission  
USB United Soybean Board 
WGRF Western Grain Research Foundation 
MWBC Montana Wheat and Barley Committee 
ICPB Iowa Corn Promotion Board 
ISCP Iowa Soybean Checkoff Program 
AWDC Alberta Wheat Development Commission 
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Appendix B. Governance structure and decision-making process of 10 agriculture PCROs  
Organization Relationship  
With private 
and public 
organizations 
Governance 
structure 
and 
Board 
appointment 
Request  
For  
Proposals  
Decision-making process Performance 
measures 
Mechanisms to 
collect farmer’s 
feedbacks and 
research 
interests. 
WGRF 
(Canada) 
Revenue in 
2014:  
Total: 
30,014,642 
Checkoff 
8,604,323 
Crops:  
Wheat, barley, 
canola, pulses 
and so on. 
However, the 
main focus is on 
wheat and 
barley 
respectively. 
Investment 
portfolio:   
-Variety 
development 
WGRF does 
not invest in 
the research 
areas that are 
of interest of 
private sector.  
It also usually 
collaborates 
with public 
entities such as 
universities or 
government 
research 
organizations. 
WGRF is a 
membership
-based 
organization 
such that 
board of 
directors 
represents 
18 PCROs 
or 
associations 
as the 
members of 
this 
organization
.  
  
WGRF does 
not have call 
for proposal, 
instead it uses 
three annual 
call by ADF in 
Saskatchewan,  
AFC in 
Alberta and 
ARDI in 
Manitoba.  
Occasionally it 
contributes to 
Genome 
Canada 
funding.  
Also it is 
involved in co-
funding with 
other 
organization-
Three main bodies are involved in the 
process of decision-making including: 
board of directors, research committee 
and staffs.  
In the first step, WGRF receives the 
titles of LOIs sent to ADF, AFC and 
ARDI. WGRF’s staffs review the titles 
and ask for the full LOIs expected to 
have high values.  
In the next step, research committee 
comprised of four board members and 
five to seven experts reviews the LOIs. 
The reviews are conducted in three 
areas that are: variety development, 
production and post-production.  In 
general, the research committee is in 
charge of reviewing LOIs and 
proposals and recommendation to 
board for final decisions. In this step 
the research committee reviews the 
LOIs based on three criteria: scientific 
For individual 
projects, WGRF 
asks for annual 
progress and 
final reports 
reviewed by the 
staff.  
In the presence 
of co-funding, 
WGRF accepts 
the reports 
received by 
funding 
partners.  
Another 
performance 
measure for 
individual 
research is the 
number of 
presentations of 
There are three 
sources by 
which WGRF 
find out about 
farmers’ 
investment 
interests:  
1- inputs of 
board members.  
2- interaction 
with other 
organizatio-ns 
3- reports and 
researches 
addressing the 
gaps in the 
agriculture.   
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-Production 
(agronomy) 
-Post-
production 
  
 
on.   merit, potential impact on producers 
and likelihood of success.   
The research committee asks for full 
proposals of those LOIs that passed 
the second steps’ filters. 
In this step research committee 
reviews the proposals based on the 
three criteria mentioned in the second 
step. However, in this stage, each 
committee member individually ranks 
the three criteria by A, B, C and D 
where A refers too best and D to the 
worst. In this process there are also 
discussions among the member of the 
research committee. Finally, the 
research committee ranks the criteria 
based on consensus and if one of the 
criteria is ranked C or D, the proposal 
will not be recommended to the board 
of directors for a final decision. 
At the final step the board of directors 
make final decisions to fund a 
proposal or not and this decision is 
usually based upon the 
recommendation of research 
committee. In this stage the staff of 
WGRF communicate with other 
funding organizations to find out about 
co-funding opportunities.   
publications for 
each project.  
WGRF does not 
measure its 
general 
performance on 
a regular basis.   
 
GRDC 
Australia 
Revenue: 
 
GRDC is 
highly 
involved in 
 
There are 
four main 
bodies of 
 
GRCD calls 
for tenders 
through which 
 
The process of decision-making in 
GRDC includes six steps and is mostly 
a bottom-up process. The main steps 
 
GRDC uses 
several methods 
to evaluate its 
 
GRDC uses 
several sources 
to identify the 
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GRDC’s 
investments are 
funded by levies 
and Australian 
government 
contribution and 
royalty income. 
Farmers pay a 
1% levy to the 
GRDC if they 
produce any of 
25 different 
crops including 
wheat, coarse 
grains, pulses 
and oilseeds. 
The Australian 
government 
contributes to 
GRDC funding 
by paying 0.5 
percent of the 
three-year 
average of the 
25 crops’ gross 
values. 
Total revenue in 
2015: 196 
million AUD 
including 69.1 
million from 
Australian 
government and 
collaboration 
with public 
and private 
organizations.  
Government 
appoints 
GRDC’s 
boards. The 
government 
funds about 
30% of 
GRDC’s 
budget as well. 
Furthermore, 
GRDC’s 
investments 
are highly 
affected by the 
priorities of 
the Australian 
Government,  
On the other 
hand, GRDC 
has 
considerable 
collaborations 
with both 
universities 
and private 
research 
companies in 
the form of co-
funding of 
decision-
making in 
GRDC.  
The Board 
of directors 
is the most 
important 
body and it 
is in charge 
of 
governances
, setting 
strategies 
and 
performance 
monitoring. 
Australian 
government 
based on 
board 
resume and 
recommend
ations of 
growers and 
other 
industry 
stakeholders 
appoints 
GRDC’s 
directors.  
Panels: it 
comprises 
both 
research 
providers 
submit their 
proposals. 
GRDC usually 
is more 
interested in 
collaborative 
funding of 
projects; 
therefore, 
based on the 
results of 
decisions made 
in the 
investment 
weeks, 
proposals are 
chosen for 
funding. If a 
researcher 
independently 
proposes a 
research 
project GRDC 
develops a 
request for 
proposal to 
solicit 
competitive 
bids for the 
topic.  
If there are 
of decision-making in GRDC are 
summarized as follows: 
Priority identification: Regional panels 
collect information about the regional 
and national issues through 
communication with growers, industry 
representatives and Regional Cropping 
Solution Networks (RCSNs). In this 
process, RCSNs and regional panels 
play important roles. There are nine 
RCSN in Southern and Western 
Australia. The southern region is 
divided into four zones based upon the 
amount of precipitation: high, medium 
and low rainfall zones and irrigation 
zone. The western region is divided 
into five “port zones” including 
Geraldton, Kwinana West, Kwinana 
East Esperance and Albany.  
RCSNs were created over the past 
three years to provide information 
related to problems and priorities in 
their regions. Growers, agribusiness 
owners and researchers in each zone 
are the members of RCSNs. They 
meet on a regular basis to discuss the 
main issues and demands for R&D 
investments. For instance, 36 priorities 
were identified in Southern RCSNs 
during 2013-2014 resulting in GRDC 
making new investments in 17 areas 
and further issues were addressed by 
increasing investments in ongoing 
performance.  
In the project 
level GRDC 
uses annual 
progress reports 
and final 
reports.  
In addition, for 
some of the 
projects GRDC 
commissions 
external experts 
to evaluate the 
economic 
impact of 
investments in 
project levels.  
In addition, 
GRDC conducts 
surveys among 
farmers and 
research 
partners.  
Farmers’ 
surveys are 
especially used 
to figure out 
whether the 
projects 
conducted 
benefited the 
growers or not.  
The research 
research 
interests.  
These sources 
are:  
Regional panels, 
RCSN, growers’ 
surveys, 
research 
partners’ 
surveys and 
researchers’ 
ideas.   
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113.4 million 
dollar of 
checkoff 
revenue.  
Investment 
themes: 
-Crop yield 
improvement, -
Market 
development, -
Crop protection,    
-Farm resources 
base 
improvement, -
Building skills 
and capacity 
and  
-Advancing 
profitable 
farming systems 
projects.   regional and 
national 
levels 
panels. 
There are 
three 
regional 
panels that 
are 
northern, 
southern 
and western 
regional 
panels. 
They are in 
charge of 
identificatio
n of 
regional and 
national 
issues, 
determinatio
n of 
priorities, 
interacting 
with 
growers and 
informing 
them about 
GRDC’s 
plans and 
achievement
s. Regional 
issues related 
to intellectual 
property rights 
or lack of 
experts to bid 
on the 
proposals, 
GRDC will 
engage in 
direct 
negotiations 
with the 
research 
providers. 
According to 
GRDC, about 
50 percent of 
investments 
per year are 
made through 
direct 
negotiations 
while the 
remaining half 
is funded 
through the 
tendering 
process. 
 
projects.  
Regional panels analyze the 
information, set the regional priorities, 
and identify investment demands for 
R&D. Using the analysis of regional 
panels and other information collected 
through different reports and 
communications, national panels 
provide advice for the board to set the 
strategies and investment themes. In 
this stage, Australian government 
priorities are taken into account as 
well.  
Investment planning week: Regional 
panel members and GRDC’s managers 
meet in July or August for further 
discussions about priorities and 
investment gaps. Based on the analysis 
of information during the first and 
second step, GRDC managers make 
decisions regarding budget allocations 
between investment themes. In this 
stage, board and regional panel 
consultations play important roles.  
After discussions regarding GRDC 
budget allocations between investment 
themes, managers provide proposals 
for needed R&D investments. The 
regional panels and GRDC managers 
rank the proposals. Based on the 
rankings, the national panel provides 
recommendations to the board with a 
final resource allocation plan.  
partners’ 
surveys are 
conducted to 
provide 
information 
about the 
effectiveness of 
GRDC’s 
relationships 
with its partners 
and they are 
used to solve 
possible 
problems in 
GRDC’s 
operations.  
 GRDC also 
provide annual 
operational 
plans in which it 
provides 
measures of its 
performances in 
achieving the 
expected 
outcomes of 
investment 
themes and 
strategies. These 
measures are 
based on several 
reports and 
surveys 
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panels' 
reports to 
the board 
through 
national 
panel. 
The Senior 
Leadership 
Group: that 
includes the 
managing 
directors 
and business 
groups 
managers.  
Business 
Groups: 
This is 
composed 
of four 
groups 
managing 
GRDC’s 
activities.  
 
In the fourth step, GRDC calls for 
proposals based on the investment 
priorities. These priorities determine 
what the issues should be addressed 
and how they are related to five and 
ten year strategies.   
As the priorities and expected 
outcomes are determined Each priority 
has evaluation team including 
members of regional plans, managers 
of GRDC and consultants.   
The teams evaluate the applications 
based on seven criteria. In fact, the 
applicants should provide information 
about extent to which their meet the 
criteria. 
The criteria are: 1- a plan to achieve 
the outcomes, 2- a plan about the 
project contributions to achieve the 
outcomes, 3- record of project 
participants, 4- freedom to operate in 
terms of IPR, 5- value for money or a 
cost effectiveness analysis of the 
project, 6- consistency with the 
objectives of GRDC plans and 7-
effectivness and quality of risk 
controls. 
Criteria are weighted differently for 
each priority and evaluation teams 
create a shortlist of best applications 
by calculating the scores under the 
priorities. The shortlist includes the 
applications that address the criteria, 
provided on a 
regular basis.  
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create proper value for money or 
benefits and appropriate risks.    
In the second phase of evaluation, 
GRDC asks the applicants to provide 
more detailed information about their 
proposals. Based on the assessments 
of detailed proposals, GRDC may start 
to negotiate with the applicants to 
select the best application for funding.    
After that and in the fifth step, 
progress reports and reviews are taken 
into account for making decisions 
about further resource allocation and 
finally, in the sixth step, final reports 
are assessed along with deliverables 
promised in the approved proposals.  
 
USB 
United States 
Revenue:  
There are about 
570,000 
registered 
soybean 
producers in the 
US who pay 0.5 
percent of their 
sales price as 
the non-
refundable 
checkoff. Half 
of this amount 
is allocated to 
USB 
considerably 
interact with 
both public 
and private 
sector.  
In the case of 
USSEC, both 
USB and 
federal 
government 
fund this 
organization to 
enhance the 
market share 
of US 
By law, 
USB can 
only spend 
up to 3% of 
its revenue 
on 
administrati
on costs. To 
deal with 
this 
constraint, 
this 
organization 
has defined 
three 
projects to 
The board of 
directors 
identifies 
issues related 
to research 
interests. 
Based on the 
board 
decisions, USB 
provides a plan 
for allocation 
of resources 
and a 
preliminary 
budget. The 
budget is then 
USB uses matrix format in the process 
of decision-making. In this matrix 
there are four target areas that are: 
domestic opportunities, international 
opportunities, supply and 
communication. In the same time there 
are four action teams that are meal, oil, 
freedom of operation and consumer 
focus. These action teams are based on 
strategic objectives of USB that are: 
increasing the values of soybean meal, 
enhancing the values of soybean oil, 
facilitating the freedom of operation 
for farmers and finally increase in the 
quality of soybean products to increase 
the demand for US soybean. So for 
Every 3 year 
USB is 
supposed to 
conduct 
evaluation of its 
investments. 
The results of 
these 
performance 
measurements 
shows that on 
average USB’s 
investments 
have yielded 
BCR of six in 
each year.   
USB relies on 
several 
mechanisms to 
collect 
information 
about farmers’ 
needs and 
research 
interests.  
Some of these 
mechanisms are:  
Survey of 
farmers' needs,  
Interaction with 
state level 
checkoff 
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USB (national 
level program) 
and the other 
half to state 
level checkoff 
program. On 
average each 
year farmers 
collectively pay 
about $ 220 
million as 
checkoff 
divided between 
national and 
state level.   
In 2014 USB 
revenue was 
$109,775,559 
USD 
Investment 
Portfolio:  
Meal, oil, 
freedom to 
operate, 
customer focus 
soybean.  
In the case of 
production 
research, USB 
mostly rely on 
universities 
and other 
public 
organizations 
researches.  
 
outsource an 
important 
part of it 
administrati
ons 
activities. 
These 
projects are 
related to 
production 
research 
(supply), 
market 
developmen
t and 
communicat
ion. These 
projects are 
contracted 
to 
Smithbuckli
n, United 
Soybean 
Export 
Council 
(USSEC) 
and Osborn 
Barr 
respectively. 
The 
directors of 
USB are the 
state levels 
reviewed by 
Agriculture 
Marketing 
Service (AMS) 
of United State 
Agriculture 
Department 
(USAD). If 
AMS approves 
the budget, 
USB request 
for proposals 
based on the 
decisions made 
in the board.     
 
each target area there are four strategic 
objectives to follow and action teams 
are in charge of pursuing these targets.   
In the context of matrix, board 
members are first assigned to action 
teams and again for each action team 
they are divided into smaller groups. 
These small groups comprising three 
or four directors assigned to the target 
areas of their action team.    
In other words, there are 16 groups 
including three or four directors where 
each of these small groups becomes in 
charge of an action team for target 
areas. For instance, three or four 
members of board of directors decide 
about the issues and type of decisions 
that should be made for soybean oil in 
the case of production research 
(supply).  
In this system, the resource 
allocations’ decisions for each target 
area are made with consideration of 
similar action team in the other areas. 
It means that the action teams are 
aware of issues in all of the target 
areas and they interactively make 
decision.   
The issues addressed in the matrix 
components are used as the 
preliminary resource allocation 
decisions. However, the staffs of 
primary contractors (Smithbucklin, 
 program.  
Inputs of board 
of directors as 
active farmers.  
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boards and 
in the USB 
level, states 
recommend 
these people 
to the 
federal 
government 
for 
appointment 
in USB 
board. 
There are 73 
directors 
involved in 
USB 
decision-
making. The 
number of 
directors 
from each 
state is the 
function of 
soybean 
production 
in the state. 
For 
instance, 
Iowa has 
four 
directors in 
USB board.     
 
USSEC and Osborn Barr) provide 
program briefs related to their area in 
which they discuss the constraints, 
role of USB and issues related to 
decisions made. In the next step the 
directors and staffs related to each 
target area meet so to discuss the 
programs in more detail. In this stage, 
external experts might also be invited 
to discuss the possible outcomes and 
constraints of these programs. Based 
on the projections of checkoff 
revenues and other related 
information, board makes decisions 
about the allocation of available 
resources. These individual decisions 
become the USB’s budget. The budget 
is then reviewed by Agriculture 
Marketing System (AMS) of United 
State Agriculture Department (USAD) 
and if AMS approves the budget, USB 
request for proposals.    
In the next step, researchers send their 
proposals. The researchers are 
supposed to provide following 
information: outputs and deliverables, 
probability of success or failure and 
quantifiable indicators of performance 
such as adoption rate or other 
indicators showing a change in 
farming practices of farmers as a result 
of output of the project.  
 and the target area’s staffs provide a 
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 summary of these proposals for the 
board of directors assigned to that 
target areas. These summaries include 
information about possible outcomes, 
chance of success and other technical 
information. The type of information 
provided about the possible outcomes 
id different for different action teams. 
For instance, those projects related to 
the industrial use of soybean provide 
more detail information about the 
effect of a proposed research on 
demand for soybean. In another 
example, USB conducts an annual 
survey in which it collects information 
about the effect of different diseases 
on the production all around the US. 
These surveys are finally used for 
evaluation of proposals sent to USB 
that are related to soybean diseases.  
Based on these summaries, board of 
directors decides whether to fund the 
project or reject it. 
Iowa Soybean 
Checkoff 
Program (ISCP) 
(US) 
Checkoff 
Revenue in 
2015:  
11,000,000 US 
dollars 
Crop:  
Iowa Soybean 
encompasses 
two 
organizations 
that are ISCP 
and Iowa 
Soybean 
Association 
where the 
latter focuses 
ISCP 
collects 0.5 
of 0.5 cents 
per bushel 
as checkoff. 
There are 
nine crop 
districts in 
Iowa where 
each district 
Based on the 
priorities 
determined by 
board, research 
managers in 
ISCP provide 
RFP. 
The RFPs are 
sent to three 
groups that are 
Every year directors and staff get 
together in March and discuss the 
issues and possible plans to address 
those issues. After the discussions 
board of directors decides about the 
priorities that need to be addressed. 
These processes are based on voting 
and in recent years, board of directors 
in Iowa soybean has voted for 
investment in agronomic researches, 
In the case of 
individual 
projects 
progress and 
final reports are 
used as the 
performance 
measures.  
ISCP has 
created key 
ISCP several 
sources to find 
out about 
farmers needs 
and research 
interests that 
are:  
-Information 
collected by on-
farm group 
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Soybean 
Research 
investment 
portfolio:   
-Germplasm by 
focus on yield 
increase 
-Breeding 
-disease, 
nematode, pest 
and inset 
-weed 
management  
-nutrient 
management of 
soybean 
-water quality 
-agronomics   
mostly on 
policy and it 
cannot use 
checkoff 
money for that 
purpose.    
ISCP mostly 
collaborate 
with Iowa 
State 
University and 
in average it 
has invested 
$3 million 
dollars in this 
university per 
year from its 
establishment.  
In addition, it 
has close 
connection 
with other 
soybean 
checkoff 
programs in 
federal and 
state levels.  
In the state 
levels ISCP 
collaborate 
with 11 states 
located at 
north and 
has two 
representati
ves in ISCP 
and in 
general 21 
member 
boards are 
elected from 
the whole 
state.  
 
 
 
board 
members of 
ISCP, research 
managers in 
other checkoff 
programs and 
research 
manager in 
USB. The last 
two groups 
usually receive 
the RFPs to 
inform ISCP 
about 
possibility of 
overlapping 
investments.   
After that the 
potential 
researchers are 
informed about 
the priorities of 
ISCP. The 
researchers are 
asked to 
submit 
proposals that 
are 5 to 7 
pages. A 
proposal 
should clearly 
indicate that it 
would provide 
infrastructures and market promotion 
as the main priorities respectively. 
After the determination of priorities, 
staffs of Iowa Soybean provide a 
preliminary budget based on the 
priorities determined by board. In 
another meeting held in June of each 
year, board of directors and staffs 
discuss the preliminary budget and 
board make the final decisions about 
the allocation of resources.  
There are four committees including 
supply (production research), demand 
(new uses, biodiesel, international 
marketing and soybean meal), policy 
and information and education 
(provide information about farm 
management and communication with 
farmers about the results of ISCP 
research results and their extensions).  
In the case of production research, the 
resources are allocated between four 
main areas that are:  
1-On-farm group: this group collects 
information from soybean farms and 
informing farmers about new solutions 
for agronomic issues.  
2-Environmental services: testing 
water and soil quality for soybean 
farmers and outside organizations with 
the use of ISCP own water quality lab 
3-North Central Soybean Research 
Program (NCSRP): NCSRP 
performance 
indicators used 
to measures the 
performance of 
this organization 
toward its 
objectives.  
 
 
 
-Information 
shared in 
NCSRP by other 
states 
-Inputs from 
board members 
as active 
farmers.  
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central parts of 
US. This 
collaboration 
is in the form 
of an 
organization 
called North 
Central 
Soybean 
Research 
Program 
(NSSRP). 
NCSRP 
includes 12 
soybean 
checkoff 
programs and 
its job is the 
investments in 
the research 
gaps that are 
common 
between these 
states. ISCP’s 
research 
manager 
currently 
governs 
NCSRP.  
 
   
 
proper return 
to investment. 
Especially in 
the case of 
applied 
researches, 
ISCP ask the 
researchers to 
provide 
economic 
impact of 
researches. 
Furthermore, 
the researchers 
should 
illustrate the 
key 
performance 
indicators and 
the methods by 
which KPIs are 
measured.   
 Researchers 
have to show 
how the results 
benefit 
soybean 
farmers both in 
long run and 
short-run.   
 
 
encompasses 12 states located at the 
north central US and producing 
soybean. The investments in NCSRP 
are primarily related to common issues 
of the 12 states in soybean production.     
4-Investment in research project and 
collaboration with Iowa State 
University (ISU): ISCP extensively 
collaborates with ISU and in average it 
has invested $3 million dollar in this 
university during the recent years.   
Board of directors mostly monitors the 
performances of the first three 
investment themes and do not make 
direct decisions about their 
investments. Furthermore, on-farm 
and environmental services teams 
usually leverage their funds either by 
collaboration with other organizations 
or providing services for outside firms.   
In the fourth case, ISCP request for 
proposals based on the priorities and 
objectives determined by board of 
directors. The proposals are then sent 
to ISCP and research program staffs 
provide information about the 
proposals for board members. The 
board discusses these proposals and 
their consistencies with ISCP 
priorities. Based on these discussions, 
directors decide about those proposals 
that should be funded by ISCP.   
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Iowa Corn 
Promotion 
Board (ICPB) 
(US) 
Checkoff 
Revenue in 
2015:  
17,213,411 US 
dollars 
Crop:  
Corn 
Research 
investment 
portfolio:   
-Corn 
Utilization 
(Bio-Plastics) 
-Genomic 
improvement 
-Efficiency of 
Nitrogen use 
 
ICPB 
extensively 
cooperate with 
Iowa state 
university. 
ICPB 
primarily 
works with 
universities 
and private 
labs for 
conducting 
research. 
Based on the 
recent 
decisions in 
IC, a part of 
IPRs of the 
patented 
researches 
should belong 
to this 
organization as 
well. 
However, 
before this 
decision, only 
the research 
partners would 
own the IPRs.   
IC is interested 
ICPB’s 
checkoff is 
1 cent per 
bushel and 
it is 
refundable. 
The 
checkoff is 
spent on  
R&D, 
market 
promotion, 
funding 
start-up 
companies 
and 
commercial 
deployment 
of 
technologies
.    
Iowa corn 
encompasse
s two 
organization
s that are 
ICPB and 
Iowa corn 
association.  
The former 
is in charge 
There is no 
call for 
proposals in 
ICPB as staff 
and board 
members of 
ICPBs define 
the projects.  
 
The members of board of directors 
determine the priorities. The research 
committee has determined two main 
areas as the priorities of the 
organization that are expansion of 
corn’s industrial usage and genetic 
improvement. In the former priority, 
ICPB focuses on replacing petroleum 
based products with renewable 
products from corn. In this case ICPB 
decided not to increase the role of corn 
in production of processed foods to 
avoid competition with other 
commodities to produce food.  
After the identification of priorities, 
ICPB uses industrial consultants to 
elaborate the technical issues related to 
the priorities. Using the priorities and 
consulting with external experts, ICPB 
defines a handful of projects.  In the 
next step ICPB with the help of 
consultant conducts a preliminary 
analysis of market for the defined 
projects including, market 
opportunities, volume, competition 
and possible role of IC. After that the 
ICPB decides about the best possible 
research partners.  
The main criteria used by ICPB to 
determine the projects to fund are 
market volume, cost of production and 
ICPB evaluates 
its performance 
based on pre-
defined 
milestones. In 
addition, an 
important 
performance 
measures in the 
case of research 
is the number of 
patent this 
organization has 
gained.  
 
 
ICPB uses two 
sources to find 
out about 
farmers needs 
and research 
interests that are 
survey of 
farmers and 
inputs from 
board of 
directors.   
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to differentiate 
itself form 
public and 
private sectors. 
By focusing 
on the 
researches that 
are in the 
interests of 
public. In 
addition, ICPB 
tries to fund 
projects that 
improve 
industrial 
usage of corn 
in early stage 
of production.  
 
of that is in 
charge of 
market 
developmen
t and 
research and 
education 
and the 
latter 
pursues 
policy 
related 
issues and 
lobbying. 
These two 
organization
s have 
separate 
board of 
directors but 
they meet in 
the same 
time and the 
staffs of 
Iowa corn 
works for 
both of 
them.  
The 
directors are 
elected by 
farmers and 
represent 
patentability of the projects.  
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specific 
districts in 
Iowa.   
The board is 
divided into 
five 
committees 
including 
industrial 
usage, 
export,  
R&D, 
membership 
and 
checkoff 
and finally 
environment
al issues.  
 
 
 
KWC 
(US) 
Revenue in 
2014:  
4,564,259 
Crop:  
Wheat 
Research 
investment 
portfolio:   
-New Variety 
development 
KWC has 
close 
collaboration 
with two other 
organizations 
in Kansas that 
are Kansas 
Wheat 
Alliance and 
Kansas Crop 
Improvement 
Association. 
 KWC was 
established 
in 1957 by 
legislation 
and in 2012 
it was 
privatized. 
Wheat 
farmers in 
Kansas 
voluntarily 
pay 2 cents 
Based on 
priorities 
determined by 
board of 
directors, 
KWC along 
with two other 
organizations 
in Kansas that 
are Kansas 
Wheat 
Alliance and 
 Board of directors is in charge of 
determining priorities in KWC. The 
main component of priorities in KWC 
is its four ongoing breeding programs, 
so if a LOIs is consistent with these 
programs, the research committee will 
ask for full proposals. In average more 
than 90% of LOIs are approved and 
about 45% of the proposals are 
funded.  
After sending full proposals, all the 
researchers are invited to a one-day 
For individual 
projects, KWC 
asks for annual 
progress report, 
reviewed by the 
staff.  
However, there 
are no general 
performance 
measures used 
by KWC.   
The main focus 
of KWC is on its 
four breeding 
programs.  
Therefore, an 
important part of 
its investments 
are related to 
these programs.  
In other issues, 
KWC relies 
mostly on board 
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-Production 
(agronomy) 
-Trait discovery 
and 
biotechnology 
-Testing new 
technologies 
and methods 
-Industrial use 
-Consumer 
preferences   
  
 
These three 
organizations 
call for 
proposals in 
the same time, 
however the 
proposals are 
divided 
between these 
organizations 
based on their 
goals that 
might be 
different.  
In addition, 
KWC 
collaborate 
with wheat 
commissions 
in other central 
states of the 
US to avoid 
overlapping. 
 
. 
per bushel 
“wheat 
assessment”
. 
There are 9 
directors in 
KWC 
elected by 
farmers. In 
general, 7 of 
the directors 
represent 9 
districts in 
Kansas and 
2 of them 
are directors 
at large.  
Kansas Crop 
Improvement 
Association 
request for 
proposals.  
In the first step 
the researchers 
are supposed 
to send LOIs. 
If research 
committee 
approves the 
LOIs (In 
average more 
than 90% of 
LOIs are 
approved) the 
researchers 
receive 
invitation to 
submit full 
proposals. 
meeting in which they are asked to 
present their proposals and ideas for 
research committee. 
In this meeting the research committee 
members use a scoring sheet to score 
the following criterions:  
1-Relevenace of the project with KWC 
breeding program, 2-Potential for high 
return to investment, 3-cositency with 
priorities of KWC, 4-innovativeness 
and 5-consistency of budget requested 
and scope of the project. Each 
criterion can be scored from five 
(excellent) to one (poor). At the end of 
the meeting the scores of criterions for 
each project are added together where 
relevance to KWC breeding program 
has the highest weight. Based on the 
scores and discussions, projects are 
ranked and recommended to board of 
directors to make final decisions.  
External expertise might be used in the 
decision-making process in case they 
are needed.  
KWC has its own research lab run by 
a for-profit company in KWC to 
conduct some of the researches as 
well. The lab’s main focus is on 
genetic improvement of wheat 
varieties.  
 
 
of directors’ 
inputs as active 
farmers.   
  
Montana Wheat MWBC MWBC was Based on  Research committee reviews the  For individual A majority of 
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and Barley 
Committee 
(MWBC) 
(US) 
Revenue in 
2015:  
4,550,808 US 
dollars 
where 90% of 
this amount is 
related to wheat 
assessment.  
Crop:  
Wheat and 
Barley 
Research 
investment 
portfolio:   
-New Variety 
development 
-Production 
(agronomy) 
-Cropping 
system  
-Weed and 
Disease  
  
 
extensively 
cooperate with 
Montana State 
University. 
MWBC 
supports most 
of wheat and 
barley 
breeding 
programs in 
Montana State 
University.  
  
established 
more than 
40 years 
ago. In 1967 
and by 
legislation 
MWBC 
officially 
became in 
charge of 
collecting 
wheat and 
later barley 
assessment.  
Currently 
wheat 
producers in 
Montana 
pay 2 cents 
per bushel 
of and 
barley 
producers 
pay 3 cents 
per bushel 
of hundred 
weights as 
the 
checkoff.  
Directors in 
MWBC are 
the 
representati
priorities 
determined by 
board of 
directors and 
research 
committee in 
MWBC 
requests for 
proposals.  
Researchers 
are supposed 
to submit the 
full proposals 
in which 
methods and 
benefits for 
wheat and 
barley 
producers of 
Montana 
should be 
indicated.  
 
proposals categorizes them into high, 
medium and low groups. The 
categorizing in this stage is primarily 
based on the personal opinions and 
farm experiences of board members. 
Those proposals that are classified as 
high value are very likely to be 
funded. However, in the case of those 
proposals that are considered as 
middle value, research committee 
discusses the possible benefits and 
costs of these projects. At the end of 
this stage, the research committee 
again ranks the middle value projects 
from high to low.  
In this process, MWBC may ask 
experts to provide their expertise. 
However, this does not happen on a 
regular basis and research committee 
is more likely to rely on its members’ 
opinions to fund a proposal.  
The ranking in each stage is based on 
majority voting rule and not consensus 
among the members.  
projects, 
progress and 
annual reports 
are used as the 
performance 
measures of 
MWBC.  
Montana State 
University 
provides reports 
including 
following 
information of 
projects funded 
by MWBC in 
past and present:  
-Investigation of 
cropping system  
-Investigations 
of varieties 
performances 
-Disease and 
weeds 
managements  
 
 
researches 
funded by 
MWBC are 
long-lasting 
projects (such as 
breeding 
programs) and 
therefore, this 
organization 
does not conduct 
surveys to 
collect farmers’ 
feedbacks and 
information.  
MWBC mostly 
relies on the 
inputs of the 
directors and 
information 
provided by 
Montana grower 
association.  
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ves of seven 
districts in 
state of 
Montana.  
Farming 
organization
s in each 
region 
recommend 
a person for 
appointment 
in the board 
of directors 
of MWBC 
and 
Governor of 
Montana 
appoints the 
board 
members 
based on the 
recommend
ations. 
Board 
members at 
most can 
serve for 3 
terms (nine 
years where 
each term is 
three years).  
 
SCDC SCDC has SCDC There are three Research committee reviews the LOIs In the case of There are three 
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Canada 
 
Revenue:  
4,828,000 
 
Crop: 
Canola  
Research 
Investment 
Portfolio:  
1-Agronomic 
2-Geneteic 
improvement  
3-Utilization 
 
considerable 
amount of 
collaboration 
with Canola 
Council of 
Canada (CCC) 
and Canadian 
Canola 
Grower 
Association 
(CCGA). In 
most of the 
cases, these 
organizations 
have clear 
division of 
labors 
regarding the 
policy tasks in 
provincial, 
national and 
international 
levels.  
These 
organizations 
also have 
partnership for 
investment in 
research 
projects.  
SCDC also has 
recently signed 
non-disclosure 
collects 
checkoff of 
0.75 cents 
per ton.  
Farmers in 
Saskatchew
an elect 
eight 
members of 
board of 
directors for 
four years.  
sources used 
by SCDC to 
solicit 
proposals that 
are:  
1-SCDC own 
call 
2-Partnership 
with ADF  
3-Partnership 
with CCC  
In this process, 
first LOIs sent 
to SCDC and 
based on the 
board’s 
decision, 
researchers are 
invited to send 
the full 
proposals.  
and asks for full proposals. A LOIs is 
ruled out if its topic has already been 
covered in previous researches.  
Research committee reviews the full 
proposals sent by researchers. In this 
process, research committee highly 
relies on external advisors reviewing 
the proposals. The external advisors 
are mostly plant scientists that 
evaluate the scientific merits of 
proposals.  
At the final step research committee 
provide recommendations for board of 
directors where the final decisions 
about projects funding are made.  
  
individual 
projects, SCDC 
relies on 
progress and 
final reports 
provided by 
researchers.  
There are no 
general 
performance 
measures in 
SCDC.  
main sources of 
collecting 
farmers’ 
feedbacks and 
research 
interests that 
are:  
1-interaction 
with CCC and 
CCGA 
2-Discovery 
Forum: CCC 
organizes the 
forum where 
researches 
funded by 
SCDC and other 
organizations 
are presented for 
farmers. In this 
meetings 
farmers also talk 
about their 
current issues in 
the farms. In 
these meeting, 
the issues 
discussed by 
producers are 
taken into 
consideration as 
the future 
research topics.  
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agreements 
with some of 
the private 
companies 
engaging in 
Canola 
research. 
Based on the 
agreements 
SCDC tries to 
find out kinds 
of researches 
are conducted 
in the private 
companies. 
Using this 
knowledge, 
SCDC can 
direct its 
investment in 
those areas 
that are not 
covered by 
private sector.  
In addition, 
SCDC tries to 
distinguish 
itself from 
other sectors 
by investing 
on those 
researches that 
are not highly 
3-Inputs from 
board of 
directors as 
active farmers.  
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attractive for 
private and 
public sectors 
and in the 
same time 
might bring 
values for 
farmers.  
 
GFO 
(Canada) 
Checkoff 
Revenue in 
2014:  
8,800,00 
Crops:  
Barley 
Oat 
Soybean 
Wheat 
Corn  
Research 
Investment 
portfolio:   
-Agronomy and 
production 
-Weed, Disease 
and insect pest 
control 
-Breeding and 
Genetics 
-Crop quality 
and utilization  
GFO mostly 
collaborate 
with Guelf 
University and 
it also works 
with federal 
and provincial 
to co-fund 
some of the 
projects. It 
also has 
partnership 
with other 
checkoff 
program in the 
form of co-
funding 
projects, 
especially for 
breeding 
programs.  
Furthermore, 
GFO tries to 
differentiate 
GFO is the 
results of 
merger 
between 
several 
grower 
organization
s including 
Ontario corn 
producers’ 
association, 
Ontario 
wheat 
producers’ 
marketing 
board, 
Ontario 
soybean 
producers 
and finally 
oat and 
barley 
growers of 
Ontario.  
GFO has RFPs 
and they are 
based on this 
organization’s 
priorities.  
In the 
proposals, 
researchers 
should provide 
following 
information: 
objectives, 
methods, and 
“incremental 
value” to 
farmers of 
Ontario and 
finally 
“tangible” 
deliverables 
and outputs.  
 
In each year GFO conducts interview 
with farmers, crop advisors, 
government experts, scientist as well 
as its board members to identifies 
research priorities.  
Research committee review the 
information collected by interviews 
and decides what the properties are.  
For instance, in current year GFO’s 
main priority in agronomy is related to 
soils issues where this priority was 
determined by growers’ 
recommendations.    
GFO requests for proposals based on 
the priorities and researchers send 
their proposals.  
The staff reviews the proposals by use 
of their expertise as well as external 
reviewers and scientists.     
The reviews of proposal conducted by 
staffs and external experts are sent to 
research committee. This committee as 
a subset of board of directors discusses 
the proposals and interviews and 
There are no 
formal 
performance 
measures in the 
case of research 
investments.  
 
In the case of 
individual 
projects GFO 
primarily relies 
on interim and 
final reports.   
GFO conducts 
several 
interviews and 
surveys between 
farmers, 
scientists and 
other experts to 
find out about 
the main issues 
that should be 
addressed in its 
investments.  
In addition, 
directors’ inputs 
as active farmers 
play important 
role in 
determination of 
investments 
directions.    
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 itself from 
private and 
public sector 
by the choice 
of projects and 
focus on 
funding 
projects that 
benefit public.  
 
GFO has 15 
directors 
representing 
15 districts 
in Ontario. 
Farmers 
elect the 
directors of 
GFO.  
 
finally it provides recommendations 
for board of directors to make final 
decisions.  
Two of the most important criterions 
to assess a proposal are its relevance to 
crops grown in Ontario and feasibility 
of conducing the project.  
 
Agriculture 
Development 
Fund (ADF) 
(Canada) 
Budget in 2014:  
6,867,000 
Crops:  
Several crops 
Research 
Investment 
portfolio:   
-Agronomy and 
production 
-Weed, Disease 
and insect pest 
control 
-Breeding and 
Genetics 
-Crop quality 
and utilization  
-Production risk 
 
ADF 
extensively 
collaborate 
with checkoff 
programs in 
the province. 
This 
organization is 
involved co-
funding and 
providing 
investments 
projects for 
these 
organizations.  
It has also 
close 
collaboration 
with 
universities 
especially 
University of 
Saskatchewan.  
ADF is a 
part of 
ministry of 
agriculture 
in 
Saskatchew
an.  
Advisory 
committee 
assigned by 
minister of 
agriculture 
makes the 
main 
decisions in 
this 
organization
.  
Advisory 
committee 
of ADF 
contains 10 
members 
ADF has call 
for proposals. 
It is the main 
source of call 
for proposals 
for checkoff 
programs in 
Saskatchewan.  
In each year 
ADF request 
for proposals 
based on its 
strategic plans 
and outcomes.  
However, in 
some cases and 
in the presence 
of specific 
issues, ADF 
request for 
proposal for 
specific 
projects. 
As ADF receives the LOIs they are 
usually sent to two experts. The first 
expert is a member of regional offices 
in Saskatchewan ministry of 
agriculture. This expert is supposed to 
provide information about the 
importance and applicability of 
research topic in LOIs with producers’ 
needs and research interests. The 
second expert is a scientist that 
evaluates the scientific merits of LOIs.   
In addition, the LOIs are evaluated 
based on the following criteria:  
1-consistency with strategic goals and 
outcomes 
2-addressing gap in the research area 
and uniqueness  
3-benefiting Ag-Food industry in the 
province  
4-finacial contribution and 
collaboration from other parties 
(including checkoff programs).  
If a LOI meets the above criteria and 
There are no 
formal 
performance 
measures in the 
case of research 
investments.  
In the case of 
individual 
projects ADF 
primarily relies 
on interim and 
final reports.   
ADF primarily 
relies on the 
regional offices 
to collect 
information and 
feedback from 
farmers.  
There are 10 
regional offices 
located at 
different part of 
Saskatchewan 
are in charge of 
interaction with 
agriculture 
industry to 
provide them 
with the industry 
with information 
about 
production and 
business.  
In addition, 
  
121 
In the case of 
private sectors, 
it also has 
some 
collaboration.  
(seven from 
industry and 
three from 
ministry of 
agriculture) 
divided into 
smaller 
groups such 
as crop and 
livestock 
sub-
committees.  
 
In the first step 
the researchers 
are supposed 
to send LOIs 
and if LOIs are 
approved, 
ADF invite the 
researchers to 
submit the full 
proposals.  
  
is approved by experts, it will be sent 
to ADF advisory committee. The 
committee then invites the researchers 
to submit the full proposals.  
In this process if the members of 
advisory committee have different 
opinions about the merits of a project 
such that some members believe the 
project is valuable and some not, ADF 
will ask for full proposal regardless of 
the differences. However, ADF will 
ask the researcher(s) to address issues 
raised by the members that were 
sceptical about the project.   
The full proposals are evaluated based 
on the following criteria:  
A-strategic alignment including 1-
consistency with strategic goals and 
outcomes of ADF, 2-support from 
industry  
B-feasibility and scientific merit 
C-Impact including 1-economic effect, 
2-adoption by industry, 3- impact on 
environment.  
In average 50% of LOIs are rejected 
and the other 50% are invited to send 
full proposals. Furthermore, 80 to 90% 
of researches that are approved for 
submitting the full proposals are 
funded.  
In this process industry supports play 
important roles to choose between 
projects with similar merits.   
seven members 
of advisory 
committee are 
from agriculture 
industry that can 
provide 
information 
about the needs 
and gaps for 
research.   
For instance, 
crop producers 
can meet with 
the regional 
offices and ask 
them about their 
problems and 
needs that in 
fact can 
represent the 
research 
interests for 
farmers.  
Regional 
offices’ experts 
also play 
important roles 
in the evaluation 
of LOIs.  
ADF has close 
relationships 
with checkoff 
programs that 
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 could be provide 
proper 
information 
about needs and 
research 
interests.  
Seven out of 10 
members of 
ADF’s advisory 
committee are 
from industry 
that in fact can 
reflect the 
research 
interests. 
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Appendix C: Cobb-Douglass decision-making function. 
The choice of ! in the case of Cobb-Douglass decision-making function.  
Stage 3: The return function of the PCRO is in Cobb-Douglass form as it is indicated in equation 
C.1 where I assume that manager and the board have the same knowledge levels and equal to 1.   " = $% &'( $) ( − + − ,-. $% &'( $) ( 	     C.1 
The manager’s net utility function is shown in equation C.2  0% = + + ,-. $% &'( $) ( − &2 3%$%2        C.2 
The board’s net utility function given the optimum fixed payment from the PCROs point of 
view is illustrated in equation B.3:  0) = 4. $% &'( $) ( − 6 − &2 3%$%2 − &2 3)$)2     C.3 
where 4 = 7 + 8 representing altruism and personal gains of the board members  
The manager and the board both maximize their utility with respect to their efforts 
(9. $. $%and $)). Consequently, the efforts exerted by the manager and boards are:  
 $%∗ = 1 − < 		,	-. (=&'( 		>	?@ ABAC DE(	       C.4 
$)∗ = < =AC 	 	 (=&'( 		>	?@ ABAC DE( &AB 	 1 − < 		,	-. &'(
DEFG
    C.5 
Stage 2:  
In this stage the optimal bonus paid to the manager is determined. Therefore, the PCRO 
maximize its net return with respect to the bonus of , and I have:  ,∗ = 2(2'()(&JK@E)          C.6 
 
 
 
Stage 1:  
Given the optimal ,∗ shown in equation B.6 I now try to indicate the choice of < 
considering the Figures B.1 and B.2 show the choice of < where the arbitrary values of the model 
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parameters are 6 = 1 10 , N.2 = 1 10 and 3) = 1. However, in figure B.1 I assume the board is 
highly altruistic (4 = 1) while in figure B.2 it is assumed the board is primarily after its personal 
agenda (4 = 1 100). In these two situations I indicate the choice of < given the relative 
marginal cost of the manager to the board members.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 		 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. C.1. The choice of ! where O = P. Q, RST = P. Q, U = Q. VW = Q 
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Figure. C.1. The choice of ! where O = P. Q, RST = P. Q, U = Q. VW = Q 
 
Thus as it is indicated in figure B.1, one can see that in the presence of a highly altruistic 
board, the board’s share in the decision-making process approaches to zero if the manager’s 
marginal cost of spending effort is notably lower than the board of directors’ marginal cost 
(9. $. ACAB = 4). However, in the case of  ACAB = 2 the PCROs still prefers to assign considerable part 
of the decision-making to the board.  
Figure B.2 illustrates that if the board is primarily after personal gains, the manager will 
take over the decision-making assignment even if his marginal cost of exerting effort is 
significantly more than the board’ marginal cost (9. $. ACAB = 2). Therefore, one can see that even 
in the presence of a Cobb-Douglass decision-making function, the PCRO still prefers to delegate 
most of the decision-making assignment to one of the agents. 
